To Karen's mind

The Body and Society

Explorations in Social Theory

Bryan S. Turner

Basil Blackwell

Contents

.of human suffering and the indignity of death; they are therefore inevitably cultural responses to the problem of theodicy. The intellectual task of making that convergence theoretically systematic and deliberate is consequently not only an important item on the agenda of contemporary sociology of religion, but of the sociology enterprise as a whole.

4

Bodily Order

Hobbesian Materialism

It has been argued that the problem of order (namely the question 'how is society possible?') is fundamental to any social theory. The question has traditionally divided sociology into two distinctive branches of enquiry. Conflict theory argues that social order is deeply problematic and, insofar as it exists at all, is brought about by coercive circumstances, political constraint, legal force and the threat of violence. Consensus theory treats social conflict as abnormal by arguing that social stability is brought about by fundamental agreements over social values and norms which are instilled in social members by the process of socialization which rewards conformity to existing arrangements. This clear-cut analytical division rarely occurs in a 'pure' form, since social theories tend to adopt elements of both types of explanation. For example, the concept of 'hegemony', which is often used to explain the relative stability of capitalist societies, is a mixture of both cultural consensus and political coercion. The debate about social order in contemporary sociology owes a great deal to the formulation of the so-called Hobbesian problem of order in Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action* (1937).

Parsons's study of shared values as the ultimate bed-rock of social order was a reply to positivist theories of social action. For example, rational positivism argued that human action was to be explained in terms of the rational pursuit of egoistic interests such that any deviation from interest was irrational action. Hedonistic psychology and utilitarianism   adopted   similar   views   of   the   nature   of   human behaviour: human behaviour was rational in that human actions were

aimed at the maximization of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Parsons's argument was that such a model of human action was incapable of explaining social order and could not successfully distinguish between 'action' and 'behaviour'. If human beings rationally pursued their individual interests, they might quite rationally employ force and fraud to achieve their ends, but it would then be difficult to account for social order and stability in the widespread presence of force and fraud. In Parsons's argument, there has to be some minimal agreement about values in society for social relationships to exist at all. For example, there are certain agreements about avoiding fraud and such agreements make society possible. One criticism of social contract theory as expressed by utilitarianism is that it would not account for the binding nature of such contacts over self-interested parties. Parsons's second line of criticism was that, while behaviour might be explained within a behaviouristic framework, social action could not be. Action involves the choice of certain ends and the selection of means to achieve these ends in terms of shared standards or norms. Action is purposeful not simply in terms of a pain/pleasure principle but in terms of intention and choice. Instrumental rationality is not the only definition of rational action, since actions may be regarded as rational if they are in conformity with certain values, which are not themselves reducible to biology, environment, economic interests or psychology. Parsons's solution to the Hobbesian problem of order in terms of shared values was thus also intended to be an answer to the limitations of positivist epistemology (Hamilton, 1983).

Parsons's approach to the nature of social order has been itself the object of considerable criticism (M. Black, 1961; Dahrendorf, 1968; Gouldner, 1971; Rocher, 1974). A number of basic objections to Parsonian functionalism have arisen from this debate. One standard criticism of the Parsonian model is that it cannot provide an adequate theory of social change, because it exaggerates the level of value coherence within societies. Another criticism is that, while values may be normatively adhered to, general values may also be accepted pragmatically because the alternatives to these values are not available or inadequately perceived (Mann, 1979). Parsons's treatment of values also assumes that the same values are held by all members of a society; an alternative position argues that different classes in a society may hold different value systems and that coherence of societies is to be explained by economic constraints on action (Aber-

crombie, Hill and Turner, 1980). Another general criticism of Parsons is that his sociology is couched at such an abstract level that it does not lend itself to empirical falsification.

Although Parsons has provided much cogent counter-criticism (Parsons, 1977), and although his approach is still subject to on-going assessment (Alexander, 1982), it is interesting to reflect on the nature of the problem of order by returning to its formulation in the work of Hobbes. Parsons referred to Hobbes's solution to the problem of the possibility of society as 'almost a pure case of utilitarianism' (Parsons, 1937, p. 90) and yet it would be far more accurate to see Hobbesian philosophy as a pure case of materialism. Hobbes's aim was to reconstruct political philosophy in terms of scientific principles, because he regarded existing philosophy as underdeveloped or uncultivated: 'Philosophy seems to me to be amongst men now, in the same manner as corn and wine are said to have been in the world in ancient times. For from the beginning there were vines and ears of corn growing here and there in the fields; but no care was taken for the planting and sowing of them' (Molesworth, 1839, vol. 1, p. 1). Hobbes's starting point was the geometry of bodies and the principles of motion. His materialist philosophy was developed in three stages: the motions of bodies in space, the psychology of men and finally the analysis of such 'artificial' bodies as the corporation and the state. Thus he wrote that his intention was to discuss 'bodies natural; in the second, the dispositions and manners of men; and in the third of the civil duties of subjects' (vol. 1, p. 12).

Hobbes started out characteristically with a definition of body as extension and referred to man as an 'animated rational body'. Hobbes went on to argue that in nature men enjoy a general equality of their four main characteristics: strength of body, experiences, passion and reason. However, this equality is undermined by vanity, appetite and comparison; because men will seek to preserve their lives, they necessarily come into conflict with other men: 'For every man by natural necessity desireth his own good, to which this estate is contrary, wherein we suppose contention between men by nature equal, and able to destroy one another' (vol. 4, p. 85). While men in nature live in a state of war, they also have reason and it is reasonable for men to pursue peace in order for them to secure their lives. The solution to the problem of order in nature is to create a society in which men transfer their individual rights to a third party, the state, which creates the conditions of general stability. Society is thus based

on a social contract by which members transfer and relinquish individual rights in the interests of peace. The result of this contractual arrangement based on mutual consent is 'a body politic' which 'may be defined to be a multitude of men, united as one person, by a common power, for their common peace, defence, and benefit' (vol. 4, p. 122). The body politic is thus the artificial body which provides the framework within which the real bodies of men can find security and peace.

There are, of course, many types of political bodies – monarchy, aristocracy and democracy – but Hobbes's main criterion of government is that it should govern in such a way as to maximize security (Sabine, 1963). All government involves sovereignty and security requires that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible. There can be no divisions within the body politic and therefore it is imperative that the church should be subordinate to the state. The other problem Hobbes had to tackle was the possibility of division within the family. In *De Corpore Politico*, Hobbes argued that man has a natural right to his own body and this raised the question of parental dominion over children. Hobbes noted that there might be an argument that the mother has a greater right over the child than the father, but such a situation might bring about a division of sovereignty within the household. Hobbes consequently came to the conclusion:

> It is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both; without which, as hath been often said before, society cannot last. And therefore the man, to whom for the most part the woman yieldeth the government, hath for the most part, also, sole right and dominion over the children. (vol. 4, p. 157)

The stability of the body politic rests on the patriarchal household in which the convenant between man and wife secures domestic peace. Hobbes went on to claim that by nature men are superior to women and therefore, in a system of primogeniture and monarchical government, male children would be preferred to female offspring:

> Seeing every monarchy is supposed to desire to continue the government in his successors, as long as he may; and that generally men are endued with greater parts of wisdom and courage, by which all monarchies are kept from dissolution, than women are: it is to be presumed, where no express will is extant to the contrary, he prefereth his male children before the female. Not but that women may

govern, and have in divers ages and places governed wisely, but are not so apt thereto in general, as men. (vol. 4, p. 160)

Unlike many other seventeenth-century theorists of patriarchy, Hobbes treated social institutions as artificial corporations or institutions rather than natural arrangements. He did however produce a characteristic theory of patriarchy in which the stability of society rests on the nature of sovereignty within the household where husbands have indivisible power over the wife, children and servants. The power of husbands was thus analogous to the power of kings. For Hobbes, the continuity of society was grounded in the continuity of bodies, property and power.

It has been argued that Hobbesian philosophy was thoroughly materialist and that his conception of an exact science, as a model for the science of politics, was taken from geometry. The individual body was a point within political space and the motion of the body was conceived in terms of appetite and aversion. The multitude of bodies, especially in a state of nature, had few distinguishing marks: 'each individual appeared as an atom, somewhat different in composition but having the same general appearance, hurtling across a flat social plane; that is, a landscape without any visible contours of social distinctions to bar his path or predetermine his line of motion' (Wolin, 1961, p. 282). The problem of order resulted from the fact that these bodies, if unchecked, would periodically collide, rather like stars in the firmament. The solution, as we have seen, was the creation of a sovereign power to regulate the motion of bodies. The notion that Hobbes did not consider the effect of social distinctions on the motion is not entirely correct, since Hobbes placed certain bodies (those of children, women and servants) under the control of patriarchal powers. Female bodies were, so to speak, slower and less weighty than male bodies, because the former were less endued with 'wisdom and courage'. Hobbesian philosophy was nevertheless essentially individualistic in that it could not offer an account of the ways in which societies are structured by social class, ethnicity, status groups or gender. For Hobbes, sexual differentiation was simply a differentiation of bodies and their potentialities; he had little conception of the cultural specialization of men and women into social roles. Almost every aspect of Hobbesian materialism is now open to question. It is difficult to maintain that Euclidean geometry provides the basic map of material reality (Harré, 1964; Peters, 1956).

In addition, many of the assumptions which are necessary for the theory of the social contract, such as the state of nature argument, are difficult to maintain.

It would appear that Hobbesian materialism has little to offer modern sociology as a theory of social order. Hobbes's social contract theory appears to be merely a point of departure for debates about the relationship between consensus and coercion in social relations. However, modern discussions of values, hegemony, legal coercion and economic compulsion as the basis of social order appear to have neglected the problem which was central to Hobbes, namely the problem of the body in space and time. In this chapter, I want to suggest that it is possible to rewrite Hobbes in order to produce a theory of social order which starts out from the problem of regulating bodies. Such a theory can include an analysis of patriarchy and power without embracing *in toto* Hobbes's mechanistic view of the body as a mater in motion. It is no longer possible to accept Hobbes's definition of the body, since the body is simultaneously physically given and culturally constituted. In this respect, it is interesting to consider Husserl's comment on the body in his study of the origins of geometry:

All things necessarily had to have a bodily character – although not all things could be mere bodies, since the necessarily co-existing human beings are not thinkable as mere bodies and, like even the cultural objects which belong with them structurally, are not exhausted in corporeal being. (Husserl, 1978, p. 177)

Hobbes's physicalist account of the body is obviously not able to take into consideration the subjectivity of the body and the embodiment of consciousness in corporeal being. The other limitation is Hobbes's atomistic treatment of the body as an individuated entity in time-space motion.

Neo-Hobbesian Problem of Order

Given these limitations on the original Hobbesian formulation of the problem of social order, it is possible, however, to formulate a neo-Hobbesian version of the body which will transcend these inherent limitations of his Euclidean framework. Following Foucault (1981), it

is important to make a distinction between the regulation of populations and the discipline of the body. Following Featherstone (1982), it is equally important to make a distinction between the interior of the body as an environment and the exterior of the body as the medium by which an individual represents the self in public. At least initially, these dichotomies are proposed as a heuristic device for constructing a general theory of the body and for locating theories of the body. At an empirical level, these four dimensions cannot be nicely separated, but this fact does not expunge the analytic value of the model. The theory can be presented diagrammatically as shown in figure 1. The argument is that the Hobbesian problem of order as a geometry of bodies has four related dimensions which are the reproduction of populations through time and their regulation in space, the restraint of desire as an interior body problem and the representation of bodies in social space as an issue concerning the surface of the body. In Parsonian terminology, every social system has to solve these four sub-problems. Since the government of the body is in fact the government of sexuality, the problem of regulation is in practice the regulation of female sexuality by a system of patriarchal power. The reproduction of populations and the restraint of the body involves at the institutional level a system of patriarchal households for controlling fertility and at the level of the individual an ideology of asceticism for delaying sexual gratification in the interests of gerontocratic controls. The control of populations in space is achieved, as Foucault (1979) suggests, by a general system of disciplines with the generic title of panopticism. In essentials, such a system of control presupposes a bureaucratic registration of populations and the elimi-

	Populations	*Bodies*	
Time	Reproduction Malthus Onanism	Restraint Weber Hysteria	Internal
Space	Regulation Rousseau Phobia	Representation Goffman Anorexia	External

Figure 1

nation of vagabondism. Finally, societies also presuppose a certain stability in the methods of self-representation in social space. In pre-modern societies, the individual body was represented through the impersonal and external *persona*, the mask which unambiguously defined its carrier. In modern societies, the problem of representation is particularly acute, since, partly as a result of the commodification of the body, the symbolic systems of presentation have become highly flexible.

These four dimensions of the body have been considered by a variety of social theorists, but no single theory has yet attempted to present a coherent account of the relationship between these features of corporeality. However, to illustrate these dimensions it is possible to select a small group of social theorists who were especially associated with a particular feature of the corporeality of social relationships. For example, Thomas Malthus has been correctly identified with the debate about the reproduction of populations and the problem of population control through either natural or moral restraints. My argument is that Malthusianism was a potent ideology of the patriarchal household in a society where population growth was regulated by delayed marriage. Max Weber has been selected as the classic theorist of asceticism and its bearing on the moral regulation of the internal body. By way of a theoretical aside, it is also suggested that Weber, not Foucault, is the pristine analyst of social disciplines and the rationalization of the body. Two contemporary social thinkers are selected in respect of regulation and representation, namely Richard Sennett (1974) and Erving Goffman (1969). The spatial regulation of populations and the presentation of self via 'Face-work' (Goffman, 1972) are problems of urbanized civilization. The locus of these features of social corporeality is to be found in the contradictions of intimacy and anonymity.

To illustrate further the complex texture of the body in society and society in the body, I want also to argue that certain characteristic 'illnesses' are associated with these dimensions of the body and that these 'illnesses' are manifestations of the social location of female sexuality, or more precisely 'illnesses' which are associated with subordinate social roles. The purpose of this classification is to make more explicit the analysis of medical history and sexual deviance which has been developed by Foucault (1973; 1981) by arguing that the medical problems of surbordinates are products of the political and ideological regulation of sexuality. Late marriage was a structural

requirement of European societies until the late eighteenth century (Andorka, 1978), a requirement which was enforced by gerontocratic and patriarchal control. The demand for late sexual gratification was ideologically enforced by certain medical theories which proclaimed the physical dangers of sexual 'self-abuse' in onanism and which expressed middle- and upper-class anxieties about the threat of masturbatory insanity. Just as capitalists were encouraged not to spend their wealth in luxurious consumption, so dependents were encouraged not to spend their sexual potentiality in unproductive onanism. Similarly, hysteria in young women was the consequence of sexual unemployment, but a necessary feature of delayed marriage in a society where marriage was an economic contract. If hysteria in the pre-modern period was an illness of scarcity (namely the inability to create new households), anorexia in the twentieth century is an illness of abundance. Anorexia is the product of contradictory social pressures on women of affluent families and an anxiety directed at the surface of the body in a system organized around narcissistic consumption. Only a social system based on mass consumption can afford the luxury of slimming. Finally, if hysteria and onanism are, as it were, diseases of time, that is delayed time, anorexia and phobias are diseases of space, that is the location of the embodied self in social space; they are diseases of presentation. The most obvious illustration of this relationship between space and illness is agoraphobia which is literally the fear of the market place. Masturbatory insanity, hysteria, anorexia and agoraphobia are aetiologically illnesses of dependency, while their traditional diagnosis and treatment reinforced and legitimated patriarchal surveillance.

Reproduction

Every society has to produce its means of existence (food, shelter, clothing) and every society has to reproduce its members. These two requirements were regarded by Engels (n.d., p. 6) as 'the determining factor in history', but the problem of populations has been largely ignored by Marxists. This theoretical silence is partly explained by Marx's violent rejection of Malthus as the 'true priest' of the ruling class and of Malthusianism as an explanation of '"over-population" by the external laws of Nature, rather than by the historical laws of capitalist production' (Marx, 1974, vol. 1, p. 495n). While Marx

claimed that every mode of production has its specific laws of popu-
lation, he did not demonstrate how these laws operated in different
epochs. The result is that Marxist demography is very under-
developed in relation to other branches of Marxist social theory.
Marxism does, however, require a theory of population, since the
production of the means of subsistence is intimately related to the
reproduction of populations – a relationship which is the nub of
Malthusianism. It has been argued that Marx, in fact, took the
demographic history of the nineteenth century as a basic assumption
of his analysis of capitalism. For example, the immiseration of the
working class and the creation of a reserve army as a result of the
displacement of labour by machinery have as an implicit assumption
the stability of the fertility rate (Petersen, 1979). Furthermore, it is
difficult to give an adequate explanation of patriarchy without taking
into account the requirements of human reproduction and the
relationship between population growth and household structure.

Malthus's argument against Condorcet and Godwin was published
in his *An Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1789. Malthusianism
had an elegant simplicity: efforts to improve the living standards of
the poorest section of the working class above the level of subsistence
would be self-defeating, since they would result in an increase in
population. The increase in population growth would, by threatening
the means of subsistence, restore the existing condition of poverty
among the working class. For Malthus, humankind (or more precisely
mankind) is dominated by two universal 'urges' – to eat and to satisfy
the sexual passions – which he described as fixed laws of nature.
These two urges stand in a contradictory relationship, since repro-
ductive capacity always outweighs the capacity to produce food. The
necessity to restrain the sexual urge in the interests of survival often
leads to 'preventive checks' on population which are immoral –
prostitution, homosexuality and abortion. Malthus's moral philosophy
was, therefore, based on a sharp dichotomy between reason and
passion. The unrestrained satisfaction of passion has disastrous con-
sequences; indeed, any 'implicit obedience to the impulses of our
natural passions would lead us into the wildest and most fatal extrava-
gances' (Malthus, 1914, vol. 2, p. 153). In what he called 'some of the
southern countries', the indulgence of the sexual impulse leads to a
situation in which 'passion sinks into mere animal desire' (p. 156).
Since sexual passion is necessary for reproduction, the solution is to be
found in 'regulation and direction', not 'diminution or extinction'
(p. 157).

There are three checks on population expansion beyond the means
of subsistence which are 'moral restraint, vice and misery'. The
population will be reduced by starvation, by unnatural sexual gratifi-
cation or by the exercise of reason to encourage moral control over
population expansion. Given these choices, Malthus thought that,
from the point of view of reason, it was desirable to bring about
certain moral preventive checks rather than allow 'positive checks'
such as war and famine to reduce the rate of reproduction. Malthus's
view on celibacy and delayed marriage as the principal methods of
prevention were influenced by his visit to Norway between the
publication of the first essay and the revised version of 1803. In
Norway, where market relations had not penetrated the agrarian
subsistence economy, farmers could not marry until they possessed a
holding of their own; marriage was controlled by economic relations
so that a man could not marry until he could support a family.
Farmers without land were forced to become servants in existing
household units. Malthus thought that delayed marriage would pro-
vide the most rational system of population restraint, but it would also
inculcate positive moral virtues. The time of delayed sexual gratifi-
cation would be spent in saving earnings and thus lead to 'habits of
sobriety, industry and economy' (p. 161). Malthusianism sought,
therefore, not to abolish sexual passions, but, through reason, to
redirect and regulate these necessary urges towards late matrimony.

Malthusian demographic theory has been criticized on a variety of
grounds. As we have seen, Marx's criticism was that Malthus had
derived population laws from fixed laws of human nature instead of
treating 'instincts' as products of social relationships. Another criti-
cism of Malthus is that he failed to see how technological changes in
agricultural production could increase the food supply without any
great increase in the cultivation of the land mass; in addition, techn-
ical changes in contraceptive methods provided the means of birth
control within marriage without recourse to abortion. Partly in
defence of Malthus, Petersen (1979) has argued that Malthus's
emphasis on late marriage as a system of population control was, at
least descriptively, a statement of the traditional European marriage
system. The practice of late marriage among the peasantry was break-
ing down in Malthus's time and it was changes in marriage patterns
which largely explained the increase in population in European
societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is some
agreement that the European marriage pattern, which combined late
marriage and permanent celibacy for a large section of the population,

was the principal social means for restricting fertility (Glass and Eversley, 1965). It is obvious that there are many competing explanations of 'the demographic transition', but family structure and marriage patterns appear to have played a major part (Laslett, 1972). A man could not marry unless, to use Laslett's expression, there was a vacant slot in the social structure which the new couple could fill. The word 'husband' itself derives from two words signifying 'to dwell' and 'house'; a husband was a householder who could afford to support a family without being a burden on the immediate community. It was not until the decline of subsistence farming, the growth of factory production and the emergence of urban occupations that the traditional pattern of late marriage began to decline in the working class. The collapse of the conventional system was accompanied by the growth of romantic love, the disappearance of parental supervision of marriage partners and the development of the modern nuclear family isolated from the wider kin (Shorter, 1977).

. There are a number of highly technical debates which surround both Malthusianism and neo-Malthusianism, and there is a massive and growing literature on the sociology of fertility (Freedman, 1975). Many of these issues are not however pertinent to this present discussion. Malthus is important for my argument because his demography is deeply embedded in, indeed presupposes, a particular moral viewpoint. His analysis implicitly assumes the existence of patriarchy and gerontocracy, since the delayed marriage pattern which he seeks to support and maintain could not operate effectively without a system of patriarchal households. In turn, this system of household power requires a powerful sexual morality advocating the benefits of delayed sexual gratification and this morality was grounded in Christian theology. Malthus provides two arguments against 'vice'. First, moral deviation in the form of homosexuality, abortion and masturbation is simply contrary to Christian teaching, but such an argument from tradition is not entirely persuasive, especially for anyone who simply does not accept traditional Christian values. Malthus had a second line of argument which could be described as ethical utilitarianism: we will be happier in marriage if we arrive at that condition with our passions intact and our sexual energies undiluted. Sexual asceticism before wedlock is a period of moral accumulation prior to consumption within marriage. It was for this reason that masturbation came to be seen as an unproductive activity and a wasteful luxury of the morally idle.

Masturbation became an object of severe moral condemnation in the second half of the eighteenth century (Shorter, 1977). In previous centuries, there was often a relaxed attitude on the part of parents towards juvenile masturbation; indeed, some medical treatises encourage moderate masturbation as a method of achieving a balance within the body's fluids. One indication of a change in attitudes was the anonymous publication of *Onania or the Heinous Sin of Self-polllution* in 1710, which became a widely read tract. The author argued that a variety of maladies, both physical and moral, resulted from this practice. In 1758, Dr Simon-Andre Tissot published his famous medical treatise on onanism, suggesting both that it resulted in dire physical consequences and that it was largely incurable (L. Stone, 1979). In France and Germany, similar tracts appeared as in, for example, S.G. Vogel's *Unterricht für Eltern* of 1786, in which infibulation of the foreskin was recommended as one cure for masturbation. By the nineteenth century, there emerged a cluster of medical categories – primarily 'masturbatory insanity' and 'spermatorrhoea' – to classify the negative consequences of 'unproductive' sexuality (Engelhardt, 1974). Masturbation was held to be responsible for 'headache, backache, acne, indigestion, blindness, deafness, epilepsy and, finally, death' (Skultans, 1979, p. 73).

There is no evidence of the 'real' incidence of masturbation in pre-modern societies; what we do possess is some impressionistic evidence about the level of anxiety expressed by parents, doctors and clergy about its undesirable consequences. What is the explanation for this moral panic? One argument suggests that the more male children from the middle class left home to attend boarding schools, the more parents felt their loss of control over the moral development of their offspring. In the new public schools of England, it was feared that children would come increasingly under the dubious moral influence of their peers and their school-masters (Ariès, 1962). This change in childhood training was also associated with a shift towards an urban life-style (Shorter, 1977), but it was also connected with a new emphasis, especially in Protestant societies, on the fundamental importance of character-training in children (Grylls, 1978). Foucault (1981) regards the increased interest in masturbation in the nineteenth century as part of a general medicalization of the urban population, which came increasingly under the surveillance of medical institutions and professionals. Perhaps the most promising explanation is provided by L. Stone (1979) who argues that in the middle class parental anxiety may

have been encouraged by the rising median age of marriage, rising fears that masturbation was on the increase. More and more men were spending a longer and longer part of their sexual mature years with no other outlet for their libido but masturbation or prostitution. (L. Stone, 1979)

For a longer historical standpoint, masturbation had always been regarded, at least in official and orthodox circles, as a major sin in both Christianity and Judaism (G.R. Taylor, 1953). In England, the Protestant Reformation brought with it not only a greater emphasis on personal sin, but a new view of the importance of childhood training and the duties of fatherhood. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, patriarchal control over the household was to some extent weakened by the doctrine of individualism, the growth of public schooling and the slow decline of arranged marriages, which were inconsistent with the Puritan notion of individual responsibility. The horror over masturbation was a defensive reaction against what was perceived as a diminution of parental authority. In addition, and contrary to L. Stone (1979, p. 321), there was a close symbolic parallel between wasted seed and wasted capital. 'Self-pollution' was a secret and deviant practice which was a product of the control over reproduction under a system of monogamy and late marriage. It was also, within the Malthusian scheme of population control, a denial of character-building asceticism, which was regarded as a necessary adjunct of successful capital accumulation.

Restraint

The reproduction of population has been in traditional European societies controlled by a variety of institutional means and especially by monogamy, celibacy, delayed marriage and patriarchy. The weakness of Malthus's argument, apart from its dubious moral basis, was that it often failed to examine the relationship between social class and reproduction. While all societies have to reproduce themselves, Engels in *The Origin of the Family* saw more clearly than Malthus that the working class reproduces labour and the ruling class, inheritors of capital. In a system of primogeniture, the ruling class demands, at the personal level, a number of ascetic restraints over the sexuality of the household members in the interests of capital accumulation and

conservation. The sexuality and reproduction of labour, at least in early capitalism, was restrained by Malthusian checks, especially disease and poverty. Capitalism is, however, a combination of contradictory forces, as Marx constantly asserted. Individual capitalists have a strong interest in the health, reliability and discipline of their own workers – hence the capitalist's tolerance, if not enthusiansm, for evangelical Protestantism (Pope, 1942; Thompson, 1963). Individual capitalists do not, however, want the burden of Poor Laws, asylums and welfare taxation – hence the capitalist's interest in a 'reserve army' of labour and migrant workers. The brutal simplicity of Malthus's argument is thus apparent: where workers fail to exercise 'moral restraint' over their reproductive potential, they will be driven by poverty and misery to restrain their reproduction. The significance and meaning of the relationship betwen asceticism and capitalism are thus different for different social classes.

Max Weber's account (1965) of the connection between religious asceticism and capitalism is notorious, and equally subject to unflagging criticism (Eisenstadt, 1968; Marshall, 1982). Weber's thesis has often been rejected out of hand by Marxist critics as a myth which suggests that thrift is the origin of accumulation (Hindess and Hirst, 1975). This myth had been wholly destroyed by Marx's argument that primitive accumulation had been achieved by violence, especially in the form of enclosures which forced the peasant off the land. Against this criticism, it can be argued that Weber's Protestant ethic thesis presupposes the separation of the worker from the means of production as a necessary requirement of capitalism (Turner, 1981). Weber then asks, assuming the alienation of the worker from productive means, what else contributed to capitalist growth by encouraging investment, limiting consumption and disciplining workers? The answer was that Protestantism through the idea of the 'calling' and ascetic disciplines brought about the origins of a process of rationalization that transformed European industrial culture. While Weber is often charged with a naive view of the connection between capitalist discipline and ascetic restraints, similar perspectives have also been put forward by Marxists. Marx in the Paris Manuscripts charged political economy with adopting self-renunciation as its basic thesis and argued that the theory of population rested ultimately on ascetic principles:

If the worker is 'ethical' he will be sparing in procreation. (Mill

suggests public acclaim for those who prove themselves continent in their sexual relations, and public rebuke for those who sin against such barrenness of marriage.... Is not this the ethics, the teaching of asceticism?) The production of people appears as public misery. (Marx, 1970, p. 152)

In the *Prison Notebooks*, Antonio Gramsci suggested that Protestantism in America, by achieving new standards of disciplined and regulated work, had paved the way for modern managerial techniques in Taylorism and Fordism. These managerial methods suppressed the 'animality' of man, training him for the regular disciplines of factory life. The interesting feature of Protestantism was that it involved self-discipline and subjective coercion rather than being an ideology enforced upon workers. Protestantism brought about a rational ordering of the body which was thus protected from the disruptions of desire in the interests of continuous factory production. Where the church failed to provide this puritanical discipline, the state filled the moral gap:

> The struggle against alcohol, the most dangerous agent of destruction of labouring power, becomes a function of the state. It is possible for other 'puritanical' struggles as well to become functions of the state if private initiative of the industrialists proves insufficient or if a moral crisis breaks out among the working masses. (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 303–4)

Gramsci treated the ascetic ordering of the body not only as a requirement of stable capitalist production, but as the moral origin of a process or industrial rationalization culminating in Taylorism and scientific management.

The real weakness of Weber's analysis of asceticism was that it failed to consider the distribution of ascetic practices by class and gender. This theoretical neglect is partly illustrated by the relationship between consumption and production. While Marx attempted to locate the crisis of capitalism in the production of commodities, the completion of the circuit of commodity-capital by consumption was also necessary for the realization of surplus-value. In the so-called under-consumptionist theory of capitalism, the crisis of the capitalist mode of production results from the fact that the demand for commodities is depressed by low wages. Against the under-consumptionists, it can be argued that consumption takes place when

capitalists buy commodities such as machinery for productive purposes as part of their investment in constant capital (Mandel, 1962). There is individual consumption by workers, but this is merely to reproduce their labour-power through the purchase of clothing and food. Marx (1970, vol. 1, p. 537) took the view that 'All the capitalist cares for, is to reduce the labourer's individual consumption as far as possible to what is strictly necessary.' This argument against the importance of individual consumption appears, however, to be static and historically implausible, since it neglects the expansion in the productive capacity of capitalism through technical changes, improved management and the struggle of the working class to increase wages. Consumption in capitalism can either be confined to a narrow section of society (a 'consumption class') or be expanded through mass production to all classes (Hymer, 1972). This claim is not to deny that there is great inequality in consumption capacity or that the export of commodities plays a major part in the realization of surplus-value. The implication is that, in addition to ascetic denial of immediate consumption by capitalists in order to accumulate through further investment in productive capital, there must also be hedonistic consumption of goods if surplus-value is to be realized. It is this contradiction between hedonistic consumption and ascetic production which Weber failed to consider as a requirement of continuous capitalist development.

In the nineteenth century, consumption was restricted to a 'leisure class', but in the twentieth century a number of important changes took place which facilitated the development of mass consumption. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the distributive system was underdeveloped and lagged behind the system of industrial production (Jeffreys, 1954). The rise of consumerism presupposes an urban environment, a mass public, advertising and the development of rationalized distribution in the form of the department store. In Britain in the 1880s most of the conditions were eventually provided by the transformation of retailing and distribution, along with the growth of advertising magazines. Other changes also had to take place in production such as the standardization of commodities, which in turn made the advertising of goods feasible in a context where commodities were replicated on a mass scale. If the early department store played an important part in the development of a commercialized bourgeois culture, the supermarket has completed this process of rationalization in the distributive system by making commodities

available to a mass market of consumers (Miller, 1981; Pasdermajian, 1954). Such a market context required asceticism at the place of production in terms of Tayloristic management of the labour process, but at the point of consumption it required a new life-style, embodied in the ethic of calculating hedonism, and a new personality type, the narcissistic person. Late capitalism thus involves a contradictory combination of asceticism and hedonism, which are spatially differentiated between the factory and the home.

Weber argued that there was an elective affinity between Protestant asceticism and the spirit of capitalism as exhibited in the works of Benjamin Franklin. The notion that 'time is money' was the secular counterpart to the Protestant concern that idle hands make easy work for the Devil. While this relationship is plausible, there is also ample evidence that individual capitalists in their personal lives did not in fact conform to this ethic. Even Benjamin Franklin appears to have diverged massively from this ascetic code (Kolko, 1961). Furthermore, when Weber referred to 'capitalists' he was of course considering male capitalists. It is, therefore, important to examine the role of social restraints of an ascetic nature on the body of women in the period of early capitalism (Smith-Rosenberg, 1978). As in feudalism, early capitalism required widespread restraints on female sexuality, especially among bourgeois women, to secure the stability of the system of property distribution. The nature of these restraints is dramatically illustrated by the history of female hysteria in the nineteenth century.

The Victorian notion of the 'hysterical woman' and earlier diagnostic labels such as 'melancholy' and 'vapours' are to be explained in terms of the contradictory social pressures on women. The term 'hysteria' is derived from the Greek word *hystera* or 'womb', since the cause of hysteria in classical medicine was thought to be the under-employment of the womb. In Egyptian medicine, the womb was thought to dry out unless the women was regularly pregnant and, by floating upwards in the body, caused pressure to build up on the brain. In Galenic medicine, the female seed becomes corrupt if it is not fertilized and this putrefaction produces the hysterical outburst (Veith, 1965). In the seventeenth century 'melancholy' was considered to have a similar aetiology. For example, Robert Burton in *The Anatomy of Melancholy* of 1621 noted that working women rarely suffered from melancholy, while wealthy but unmarried women were commonly oppressed by the malady. His solution was marriage,

religion and suitable occupations, such as charitable pursuits among the poor. What we might call the lazy womb as a physiological state was thus correlated with the lazy person as a moral condition, prevalent among certain classes of women. The social restraints of marriage were required to promote the mental stability and personal happiness of women. Women were, however, caught in a contradictory set of circumstances. They were regarded as overcharged with sexual energies, but marriage, as the only legitimate outlet for their sexuality, was often delayed within the European marriage pattern. In addition, those women who delayed marriage in the late Victorian period in order to follow a career in teaching or nursing were assumed to be especially exposed to the threat of hysterical breakdown. While parents worried about masturbationary insanity in boys, there was also anxiety about the dangers of female masturbation in a system of delayed marriage. Both masturbation and hysteria had a common root in the spoiled child: 'Petted and spoiled by her parents, waited upon hand and foot by servants, she had never been taught to exercise self-control or to curb her emotions and desires' (Smith-Rosenberg, 1972, p. 667). The answer to the sickness lay in self-discipline and good works under the watchful regime of parental restraint.

Once inside marriage, however, women were thought to be sexually underdeveloped, if not frigid, and it was this situation which drove men to prostitutes, while also excusing their behaviour. The transformation of the passions in women from adolescence to marriage was absolute, albeit somewhat miraculous. While during pregnancy they avoided the horrors of hysteria, women were confined to a private domestic sphere, where isolation and the burden of children brought on new forms of depression. The problem was that men were both necessary for female happiness and, through endless pregnancies, the cause of their distress. In the words of a more recent study of sexuality, we are reliably informed, by a man, that masturbation in women 'is always abnormal' and that 'the woman's sexuality remains dormant until it is awakened by a man' (Schwarz, 1949, p. 43). Of course, this also had to be the 'Right Man' rather than any man, since a woman had to accumulate her energies for lawful procreation. Thus, hysteria as part of a medical ideology of true womanliness had the social functions of keeping women in ther place, that is the privacy of the domestic sphere away from the dangers of public life.

Regulation

It is difficult to separate the problems of reproduction and restraint from the growth of an urban society in which populations were regulated in social space. From the eighteenth century onwards, urbanism was seen increasingly as a threat to culture, especially to the dominant culture of the elite. The growth of industrial cities involved the collapse of the traditional system of 'appearential ordering' whereby persons had been defined by the visibility of fixed status (Lofland, 1973). The techniques of regulation came, in social theory, to be bound up with questions of interpersonal intimacy and social anonymity, which in turn gave rise to a new input into the traditional Hobbesian social contract. The nature of population densities and their impact on character-structure became a linking theme in French social theory from Rousseau to Lévi-Strauss.

Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau's account of civil society was much exercised by the problems of urban existence. In Rousseau's general philosophy, human solitariness was taken to be a basic moral principle which provided the normative perspective for his treatment of nature, education and religion. The negative effect of urban crowding was to make men too dependent on the opinion of others, and their proper self-respect (*amour de soi*) degenerates into selfishness (*amour-propre*). In the discourse 'On the origin and foundation of the inequality of mankind', Rousseau sought to draw a clear contrast between the autonomous savage ('solitary, indolent and perpetually accompanied by danger') in a state of nature with urban man in civil society:

> *Amour-propre* is a purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises in the state of society, leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other, causes all the mutual damage men inflict one on another . . . in the true state of nature, *amour-propre* did not exist; for each man regarded himself as the only observer of his actions, the only being in the universe who took any interest in him, and the sole judge of his deserts . . . he could know neither hatred nor the desire for revenge, since these passions can spring only from a sense of injury. (Rousseau, 1973, p. 66n)

The problem of society is the problem of public comparisons and our dependence on social rather than personal reputation. Entry into society, especially into a city existence, obliterates pity which is man-

kind's only 'natural virtue'. The more people live in the company of others, the more selfish their behaviour becomes, since urbanization undermines natural compassion. In short, Rousseau argued that 'In proportion as the human race grew more numerous, men's cares increased' (p. 77). Troubles accumulate with the accumulation of men in urban space.

This inverse relationship between the quality of moral life and the quantity of urban bodies was also the basis of Rousseau's views on the theatre in the controversy with M. d'Alembert. In Rousseau's letter on the theatre, he was concerned to contrast the effects of theatrical performances in Geneva and Paris. In the urban environment of Paris, where the citizens are already corrupted by *amour-propre*, the theatre functions as part of state policy to entertain citizens who have nothing more positive to do with their civil liberties. By contrast, in the small republic of Geneva, the theatre must necessarily corrupt free men by exposing them to 'civilization'. In the large city 'everything is judged by appearance because there is no leisure to examine anything' (Rousseau, 1960, p. 59). Because the citizens are contaminated by selfishness, reputational worth rather than personal value becomes the sole criterion of personal stature. The theatre encourages reputational prestige, especially among women who adorn their bodies in a competitive struggle for public attention. In the crowded spaces of urban society, interpersonal familiarity breeds contempt. This theme was the dominant aspect of Rousseau's final publication, namely *Reveries of the Solitary Walker* (1979). In the ninth walk, Rousseau observed that when strangers first meet there is a formal courtesy expressed between them, but as these strangers become more familiar, civility begins to disappear. Intimacy and respect seem mutually exclusive. Public formalities appear to be necessary in the densely populated spaces of the industrial city, but they break down under the pressure of reputational displays and false selfishness. The innocence of free space disappears with the emergence of urban society; the transition from

> nature to culture depended on demographic increase, but the latter did not produce a direct effect, as a natural cause. First it forced men to diversify their modes of livelihood, in order to exist in different environments, and also to multiply their relations with nature. (Lévi-Strauss, 1969, p. 173)

The density of populations produces an extension and intensification

Bodily Order

of the social division of labour, which in turn binds people together in reciprocal relations, thereby creating greater mutual dependency.

These themes in Rousseau's view of the state of nature were reproduced in Durkheim's analysis of the division of labour (1964) and also in the romantic perspective of Lévi-Strauss's *Tristes Tropiques* (1976). Lévi-Strauss's autobiographical commentary on anthropology can be read as a Rousseau-like analysis of the consequences of Western, urban culture on primitive simplicity. In his first encounter with the West Indies, he observed 'This was not the first occasion on which I have encountered those outbreaks of stupidity, hatred and credulousness which social groups secrete like pus when they begin to be short of space' (Lévi-Strauss, 1976, p. 33). At a later stage, he was forced to note the distinction between the solitude of the South American forests and the human misery which characterized the densely populated space of Indian cities. The cities of the Indian subcontinent secreted 'Filth, chaos, promiscuity, congestion, ruins, huts, mud, dirt; dung, urine, pus, humours, secretaions and running sores' (p. 169). For Durkheim, population density and the division of labour result in a society based on reciprocity (organic solidarity) in which the individual is less subject to collective culture (*conscience collective*). For Rousseau and Lévi-Strauss, urbanization and population density undermine the moral coherence and dignity of the individual. In this respect they articulated a persistent *motif* of nineteenth-century social thought, namely an anxiety about the moral consequences of urbanization.

The Hobbesian solution to the problem of order in the theory of the social contract started out from the premise of the materiality of single bodies; the sociological problem here is that of the multiplicity of bodies in an urban environment in which interpersonal moral checks are thought to have collapsed. In Rousseau's terms, urban familiarity engenders moral contempt. My argument is that the 'solution' to this dilemma can be seen in terms of Foucault's 'anatomo-politics of the human body' and the 'bio-politics of the population' (Foucault, 1981, p. 139). Urban bodies were politically dangerous without the web of institutional regulation and the micro-disciplines of control. The surveillance and supervision of urban populations were achieved through regulation and classification, which made possible the centralized registration of bodies for policing under a system of panopticism (Foucault, 1979). In both Weber and Foucault, there is the notion that populations become progressively

Bodily Order

subordinated to rational disciplines under a process of bureaucratization and rationalization. The dangers of urban space nevertheless remained an ever-present reality for nineteenth-century liberalism: 'Appalled at the ethic of a crowded industrialized society, with its "trampling" and "elbowing", and dismayed at the ugliness of urbanized civilization, Mill sought comfort in solitude and communion with nature' (Wolin, 1961, p. 323). Demographic pressures, economic scarcity and political instability were forces which were concentrated in the narrow streets of the European cities.

These anxieties were in particular focused on middle-class women, who were seen to be especially exposed to the sexual dangers of urban space. Although Rousseau had strong views on individual freedom – 'Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains' (Rousseau, 1973, p. 165) – he assumed that women, as guardians of private morals, would be securely located in the domestic sphere (Okin, 1980). Women were especially susceptible to the dangers of false self-regard; as we have seen, theatres encouraged women to decorate their bodies in reputational competitions. In the city, new dangers abounded: infatuations, insults, abduction and moral degradation. The woman who stayed at home away from such dangers and temptations was both displaying the economic status of her husband and proclaiming her moral innocence:

> Women appearing in the streets alone 'had to be' women who went working of necessity, women whose husbands could not provide for their families single-handedly; such women could not possibly be decent. . . . Her domesticity demonstrated her economic and erotic dependence on her husband, and this in turn proved that he could provide for her material and erotic needs. (de Swaan, 1981, p. 363)

When the conditions which made the streets safe for women – street lighting, a police force, reduction in street violence – had been developed by the end of the nineteenth century, male anxiety about female independence necessarily increased. At this point, the first coherent medical description of agoraphobia appeared in 1872. The agoraphobic syndrome has not changed since the 1870s, being simply defined in terms of an anxiety about leaving the home, visiting shops, travelling alone or entering crowded spaces. In Freudian terms, the agoraphobic fears sexual seduction and represses libidinous interests in strangers. Agoraphobia in wives expresses the anxiety of husbands

with regard to their control over the domestic household, but it also expresses the wife's dependence on the security and status of the bourgeois family setting. There is, therefore, a certain degree of collusion between partners as to the symbolic significance of the 'illness', which is reinforced by a professional interest in the reality of the complaint on the part of psychotherapists. The complaint both expressed female dependency and reproduced it. Fear of the market place had now been successfully converted into a medical condition, which legitimated the power relationships of the household.

Urbanization threatened the code of impersonal *civilité* with shallow intimacies, unregulated by respect for status and position. Paradoxically, the growth of intimacy entails a decline in sociability (Sennett, 1974). The courtly tradition of manners had permitted communal sociability between strangers by discouraging selfish expressions of intimate behaviour; intimacies are socially exclusive, but also express lack of genuine feeling (Weitman, 1970). By contrast, a secular urban society generates a cult of intimacy and affectivity between strangers which offsets the threat of anonymity and which attempts to deal with public space by replacing courtly values of impersonal *civilité* (Elias, 1978). In the nineteenth century, anxieties about seductive intimacies between anonymous strangers found their symbolic expression in female agoraphobia (Sontag, 1978). As women from the middle classes entered public society in the twentieth century with the growing demand for labour in the war-time crisis of Western capitalism, 'female complaints' became increasingly presentational and symbolic of anxieties about the surface of the body. For example, dietary practices were no longer aimed to control passions within a religio-medical framework; they are now aids to self-presentation in a context where ageing is no longer expected to preclude our capacity for presenting a good face.

Representation

In pre-modern societies the person was housed in the *persona*, a public mask which was impersonal and objective (Mauss, 1979). Personality was objectified in the external marks of status and insignia. In feudal times, personhood and dignity came to reside in a man's shield, which was a privilege indicating class position. With the development of the surcoat, lambrequin and closed helmet, heraldric

signs came to stand for distinction and were marks of identification of both person and status (Fox-Davies, 1909). In such a society, the moral value of a person was embraced by the notion of 'honour' which was embedded in institutional roles so that personal and social symbols coincided. This world of honour was transformed by the development of capitalism. In England, the aristocracy was largely demilitarized by the seventeenth century and, with the enclosure movement, was transformed into an agrarian capitalist class: 'The idiosyncrasies of the English landowning class in the epoch of Absolutism were thus to be historically interlocked: it was unusually civilian in background, commercial in occupation and commoner in rank' (P. Anderson, 1974, p. 127). The hierarchical concept of honour by inheritance was gradually replaced by the notion of the gentleman as the product of education. The 'honourable gent' was urban, commercial and non-military; his status was achieved, but the commercial background was clothed with the culture of a private education (Ossowska, 1971). With the development of capitalism, formal differences on the basis of status within an hierarchical system have been overtaken, at least in principle, by differences of merit and achievement so that personal worth can no longer be invested in external signs. In practice, status symbols denoting personal worth – in housing, speech, dress and other consumption patterns – persist, but these symbols are not exclusive rights with the backing of legal entitlement. Personal moral status has become more fluid, open and flexible; the modern personality now has dignity rather than honour: 'The concept of honour implies that identity is essentially, or at least importantly, linked to institutional roles. The modern concept of dignity, by contrast, implies that identity is essentially independent of institutional roles' (Berger, 1974, p. 84). The self is no longer located in heraldry, but has to be constantly constituted in face-to-face interactions, because consumerism and the mass market have liquidated, or at least blurred, the exterior marks of social and personal difference.

The extension of the franchise and the growth of mass consumer markets have facilitated the disappearance of ascriptive signs of personal value. Although hierarchical differences at work are crucially important for personal status, mass entertainment and the leisure market are relatively free of social exclusion based on class. The commercialization of sport has reduced traditional class differences, both within and between particular sporting activities. In leisure styles, the universality of jeans and T-shirts does not remove class

distinctions, but it does mask them behind the informality of dress. Variations between societies are clearly important. The English bowler hat is still symbolic of class and personality, whereas the Australian summer enforces a certain stylistic egalitarianism: 'there is a real sense in which the absence of clearly visible and unambiguous marks of inferior status has made the enforcement of an all-pervasive deference system almost impossible to sustain outside the immediate work situation' (Parkin, 1979, p. 69). Self and the presentation of self become dependent on style and fashion rather than on fixed symbols of class or hierarchical status. Urban space becomes a competitive arena for presentational conflicts based on commercialized fashions and life-styles. There is a sense in which the self becomes a commodity with an appropriate package, because we no longer define ourselves exclusively in terms of blood or breeding.

This world of the performing self has been theoretically encapsulated in a number of streams of American sociology, particularly in so-called symbolic interactionism. Sociological awareness of the new personality structure of consumer society can be traced back to a number of classic texts. The concept of the social self in the American tradition of sociology is redolent of the naked space of consumer society. In *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Cooley (1964) spoke of the 'looking glass self' which cannot exist outside the gaze of others; our appearance in the mirror of others' responses was seen to be not only the basis of personal esteem, but constitutive of the self. Within social interactionism, the self and our public appearance are not so much conjoined but merged (G. Stone, 1962). The importance of the presentational self can be charted in Whyte's 'organization man' (1956), Fromm's 'market-oriented personality' (1941) and Riesman's 'other-directed personality' (1950). The tradition culminates in the contemporary debate on the 'narcissistic personality' (Lasch, 1979). The theme of these commentaries on American life is essentially Rousseauist: suburban America produces what Riesman called the 'lonely crowd' within which egoistic actions are draped in a false intimacy. My argument is that these texts are simultaneously diagnostic and symptomatic – they grasp the social disease of self-regarding intimacy while also expressing it. This feature of American sociology found its epitome in Goffman's compendium of interactionist concepts – 'face-work'. 'deference and demeanor', 'stigma' and 'expression games' (Goffman, 1968; 1970; 1972).

Goffman's most influential work was *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1969). In Goffmanesque society, social relations constitute a stage, upon which the social actor presents a performance either individually or in the company of a team. These social performances are threatened by the possibility of perpetual failure; performances may be disrupted by forgotten lines, embarrassment, misinformation and discrepancy. The ritual order of everyday encounters is precarious and in need of constant repair. In terms of the Hobbesian problem of order, social actors are primarily motivated by self-regard and by the desire to maintain their 'face' at all costs; order exists insofar as social actors seek to avoid stigmatization and embarrassment in public gatherings. Social life is a game in which there is little scope for trust, since all human action is simply bluff and counter-bluff. Survival in this competitive world of social espionage hinges simply on the ability to select the most advantageous set of interpersonal tactics. Goffman's dramaturgical model is thus both a mode of understanding the new middle class and a reflection of its values:

> The dramaturgical model reflects the new world, in which a stratum of the middle class no longer believes that hard work is useful or that success depends upon diligent application. In this new world there is a keen sense of the irrationality of the relationship between individual achievement and the magnitude of reward, between actual contribution and social reputation. It is the world of the big-priced Hollywood star and of the market for stocks, whose prices bear little relation to their earnings. (Gouldner, 1971, p. 381)

Society as theatre is thus Rousseau's vision of urban *amour-propre* taken to its logical conclusion – a society in which reality becomes entirely representational.

Social success depends on an ability to manage the self by the adoption of appropriate interpersonal skills and success hinges crucially on the presentation of an acceptable image. Image-management and image-creation become decisive, not only for political careers, but in the organization of everyday life. In turn, successful images require successful bodies, which have been trained, disciplined and orchestrated to enhance our personal value. A new service sector of dietitians, cosmetologists and plastic surgeons has sprung up to augment the existing body-work professions of dentistry, hair-dressing

and chiropody. In the managerial class, in order to be successful it is also important to look successful, because the body of the manager is symbolic of the corporation. The new ethic of managerial athleticism is thus the contemporary version of the Protestant ethic, but, fanned by the winds of consumerism, this ethic has become widespread throughout the class system as a life-style to be emulated. The commodified body has become the focus of a keep-fit industry, backed up by fibre diets, leisure centres, slimming manuals and outdoor sports. Capitalism has commodified hedonism and embraced eudemonism as a central value:

> The 'revolution in manners and morals', which took shape in the twenties when capitalism began to outgrow its dependence on the work ethic, has eroded family authority, undermined sexual repression and set up in their place a permissive hedonistic morality tolerant of self-expression and, the fulfillment of 'creative potential'. (Lasch, 1978, p. 45)

The new hedonism does, however, have peculiar features. It is not oppositional, being perfectly geared into the market requirements of advanced capitalism; it is heavily skewed towards the new middle class; it is also compatible with asceticism. Hedonistic fascination with the body exists to enhance competitive performance. We jog, slim and sleep not for their intrinsic enjoyment, but to improve our chances at sex, work and longevity. The new asceticism of competitive social relations exists to create desire – desire which is subordinated to the rationalization of the body as the final triumph of capitalist development. Obesity has become irrational.

All illness is social illness. At a trivial level, we know that stress is an important element in the aetiology of much chronic illness and that stress is the product of the temporal rhythmes of modern societies; social stress results in peptic ulcers (Dossey, 1982). Illness also has social consequences in the form of unemployment and domestic disruption, but at a more fundamental level social processes constitute illness, which is a medical classification of a range of signs and symptoms (King, 1954). The meaning of illness reflects social anxieties about patterns of social behaviour which are deemed acceptable or otherwise from the point of view of dominant social groups. It has been argued that onanism and spermatorrhoea were medical categories which expressed the anxieties of parents whose authority over

dependents was being questioned by new social arrangements. Hysteria was a metaphor of the social subordination of women, especially middle-class women who were attempting to express their individual independence through professional employment. Agoraphobia symbolized the uncertainty of urban space; fear of the market kept women at home, but also confirmed the husband's economic capacity to maintain a domesticated wife. If the argument is correct that in late capitalism there is for the individual a representational crisis of self-management, then we might expect, especially for women, the emergence of a presentational illness. In Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor, the characteristic illness for women should be bound up with the anxieties of face-work; it is anorexia nervosa which most dramatically expresses the ambiguities of female gender in contemporary Western societies. While it would be futile to deny that anorexia has psychological and physiological features, it also has a complex sociological aetiology and is deeply expressive of the modern view of beauty as thinness (Polhemus, 1978).

While I have attempted to separate certain illnesses in terms of reproduction, restraint, regulation and representation, the illnesses of women have one important thing in common – they are, at least sociologically, products of dependency. Female sickness – hysteria, depression, melancholy, agoraphobia, anorexia – is ultimately a psychosomatic expression of emotional and sexual anxieties which are built into the separation of the public world of authority and the private world of feeling (Heller, 1979). Masturbatory insanity and hysteria are not 'diseases' but deviant behaviour which express a crisis of delayed time: the problem of waiting for maturity in the transition from one household to another. Agoraphobia and anorexia are expressive of the anxiety of congested space. The agoraphobic suffers from protective patriarchy, the anorexic from protective parenting in the confines of the privatized family. As diagnostic categories, these illnesses also express male anxieties about the loss of control over dependents a women left the household for work and were allegedly exposed to public seductions.

The Hobbesian problem of order was historically based on a unitary concept of the body. The social contract was between men who, out of an interest in self-preservation, surrendered individual rights to the state, which existed to enforce social peace. However, the regime of political society also requires a regimen of bodies and in particular a government of bodies which are defined by their

multiplicity and diversity. The Hobbesian problem is overtly an analysis of the proper relationship between desire and reason, or more precisely between sexuality and instrumental rationality. This problem in turn can be restated as the proper relationship between men as bearers of public reason and women as embodiments of private emotion. When expressed in this fashion, it is heuristically useful to identify four sub-issues within the general problem of order. The value of the model is that it brings into focus the fact that all social structures which institutionalize inequality and dependency are fought out at the level of a micro-politics of deviance and disease. Because the body is the most potent metaphor of society, it is not surprising that disease is the most salient metaphor of structural crisis. All disease is disorder – metaphorically, literally, socially and politically.

5

Patriarchy: Eve's Body

Of Mans First Disobedience, and the Fruit
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste
Brought Death into the World, and all our woe,
With Loss of Eden

<div align="right">Milton, Paradise Lost, Book 1</div>

My argument is that any sociology of the body will hinge ultimately on the nature of the sexual and emotional division fo labour. The sociology of the body turns out to be crucially a sociological study of the control of sexuality, specifically female sexuality by men exercising patriarchal power. There are two conventional explanations of the social subordination of women, which turn out, on closer inspection, to be in fact one argument. The first may be called the nature/culture argument and the second, the property argument. One feminist account of the universality of patriarchy as a system of power relations of men over women is that, because of their reproductive role in human societies, women are associated with nature rather than culture and hence have a pre-social or sub-social status. Women have not, as it were, made the transition from animality to culture, because they are still tied to nature through their sexuality and fertility. The universality of· women's subordinate, status in society is thus explained by the universality of women's reproductive functions. The subordination of women is not essentially a consequence of physiology, but of the cultural interpretation of female reproductivity as denoting an unbreakable link with nature. The distinction between 'nature' and 'culture' is, of course, itself a cultural product. It is a classificatory scheme which allocates women to an inferior 'natural' category and men to a superior 'social' category.

Nature/Culture Argument

The result of this association with nature is that men are seen to be

References

Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B. S. (1980) *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, London.

Ackernecht, E. H. (1948) 'Anti-contagionism between 1821 and 1867', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 22, pp. 562–93.

Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. (1973) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, London.

Agich, G. J. (1983) 'Disease and value: a rejection of the value-neutrality thesis', *Theoretical Medicine*, 4, pp. 27–41.

Aitken-Swan, J. (1977) *Fertility Control and the Medical Profession*, London.

Alexander, J. (1982) 'Theoretical Logic in Sociology', *Positivism, Presuppositions and Current Controversies*, London.

Allegro, J. M. (1964) *The Dead Sea Scrolls: A Reappraisal*, Harmondsworth.

Allegro, J. M. (1968) *Discoveries in the Judean Desert*, Oxford.

Allegro, J. M. (1979) *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Christian Myth*, Newton Abbot.

Althusser, L. (1969) *For Marx*, London.

Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. (1970) *Reading Capital*, London.

Anderson, O. W. (1952) 'The sociologist and medicine', *Social Forces*, 31, pp. 38–42.

Anderson, P. (1974) *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, London.

Andorka, R. (1978) *Determinants of Fertility in Advanced Societies*, London.

Arendt, H. (1959) *The Human Condition*, New York.

Ariès, P. (1962) *Centuries of Childhood*, London.

Ariès, P. (1974) *Western Attitudes to Death, from the Middle Ages to the Present*, Baltimore and London.

Armstrong, D. (1983) *Political Anatomy of the Body: Medical Knowledge in Britain in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge.

Arney, W. R. and Bergen, B. J. (1983) 'The anomaly, the chronic patient and the play of medical power', *Sociology of Health and Illness*, 5, pp. 1–24.

Avineri, S. (1970) *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Cambridge.

Badgley, R. and Bloom, S. (1973) 'Behavioral sciences and medical education: the case of sociology', *Social Science and Medicine*, 14 pp. 348–62.

Bakan, D. (1974) 'Paternity in the Judeo-Christian tradition' in A. Eister (ed.) *Changing Perspectives in the Scientific Study of Religion*, New York, pp. 203–16.

Bakhtin, M. (1968) *Rabelais and his World*, Cambridge, Mass.

Banton, M. (1967) *Race Relations*, London and New York.

Barrett, M. and McIntosh, M. (1982) *The Anti-Social Family*, London.

Barthes, R. (1973) *Mythologies*, London.

Barthes, R. (1977) *Sade/Fourier/Loyola*, London.

Barthes, R. (1982) *A Lover's Discourse: Fragments*, New York.

Baudrillard, J. (1975) *The Mirror of Production*, St. Louis.

Beauvoir, de S. (1962) *Must We Burn Sade?*, London.

Beauvoir, de S. (1972) *The Second Sex*, Harmondsworth.

Beecher, J. and Bienvenu, R. (1972) *The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier, Selected Texts on Work, Love and Passionate Attraction*, London.

Bell, D. (1980) *The Winding Passage; Essays and Sociological Journeys 1960–1980*, Cambridge, Mass.

Benoist, J. M. (1978) *The Structuralist Revolution*, London.

Bennett, T. (1979) *Formalism and Marxism*, London.

Berger, P. L. (1974) 'On the obsolescence of the concept of honour', in P. L. Berger, B. Berger and H. Kellner, *The Homeless Mind*, Harmondsworth, pp. 78–89.

Berger, P. L. and Kellner, H. (1965) 'Arnold Gehlen and the theory of institutions', *Social Research*, 32, pp. 110–15.

Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1963) 'Sociology of religion and sociology of knowledge' *Sociology and Social Research*, 47, pp. 417–27.

Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1967) *The Social Construction of Reality; Everything that Passes for Knowledge in Society*, London.

Bernardo, A. S. (1975). 'Petrarch's Laura: the convolutions of a humanistic mind', in R. T. Morewedge (ed.) *The Role of Woman in the Middle Ages*, Albany, pp. 65–89.

Black, H. (1902) *Culture and Restraint*, London.

Black, M. (ed.) (1961) *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

Bloor, M. (1976) 'Bishop Berkeley and the adenotonsillectomy enigma: an exploration of variation in the social construction of medical disposals', *Sociology*, 10, pp. 43–61.

Boardman, P. (1978) *The Worlds of Patrick Geddes*, London.

Bonser, W. (1963) *The Medical Background of Anglo-Saxon England*, London.

Boorse, C. (1975) 'On the distinction between disease and illness', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 5, pp. 49–68.

Boorse, C. (1976) 'What a theory of mental health should be', *Journal for the*

Theory of Social Behaviour, 6, pp. 61–84.

Borges, J. L. (1973) *A Universal History of Infamy*, Harmondsworth.

Brain, R. (1979) *The Decorated Body*, London.

Braudel, F. (1974) *Capitalism and Material Life 1400–1800* London.

Breger, L. (1981). *Freud's Unfinished Journey*, Boston and Henley.

Brody, S. N. (1974) *The Disease of the Soul*, Ithaca, NY, and London.

Broekhoff, J. (1972) 'Physical education and the reification of the human body', *Gymnasion*, IX, pp. 4–11.

Brown, N. O. (1966) *Love's Body*, New York.

Bruch, H. (1978) *The Golden Cage; The Enigma of Anorexia Nervosa*, Cambridge.

Bullough, V. L. (1966) *The Development of Medicine as a Profession*, New York.

Burckhardt, J. (1960) *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, London.

Burke, P. (1978) *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe*, London.

Burns, C. R. (1976) 'The non-naturals: a paradox in the western conception of health', *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 1, pp. 202–11.

Burton, R. (1927) *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, London.

Canning, J. P. (1980) 'The corporation in the political thought of the Italian jurists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', *History of Political Thought*, 1, pp. 9–32.

Carr-Saunders, A. M. and Wilson, P. A. (1933) *The Professions*, London.

Carter, A. (1979) *The Sadeian Woman; An Exercise in Cultural History*, London.

Charcot, J. M. (1889) *Disorders of the Nervous System*, London.

Charmaz, K. (1983) 'Loss of self: a fundamental form of suffering in the chronically ill', *Sociology of Health and Illness*, 5, pp. 168–95.

Chernin, K. (1981) *The Obsession: Reflections on the Tyranny of Slenderness*, New York.

Cherno, M. (1962–3) 'Feuerbach's "Man is what he eats" : a rectification', *Journal for the History of Ideas*, 23–4, pp. 397–406.

Cheyne, G. (1724) *Essay on Health and Long Life*, London.

Cheyne, G. (1733) *The English Malady*, London.

Cheyne, G. (1740) *An Essay on Regimen*, London.

Cheyne, G. (1742) *The Natural Method of Curing the Diseases of the Body*, London.

Chua, B. H. (1981) 'Genealogy as sociology? Michel Foucault', *Catalyst*, no. 14, pp. 1–22.

Clarke, J. N. (1983) 'Sexism, feminism and medicalism: a decade review of literature on gender and illness', *Sociology of Health and Illness*, 5, pp. 62–82.

Clay, R. M. (1909) *The Mediaeval Hospitals of England*, London.

Cockerham, W. C. (1982) *Medical Sociology*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

Cooley, C. H. (1964) *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York.

Cornaro, L. (1776) *Discourses on a Sober and Temperate Life*, London.

Coulter, H. L. (1977) *Divided Legacy: A History of the Schism in Medical Thought*, Washington, 3 vols.

Coward, R. and Ellis, J. (1977) *Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject*, London.

Crapanzano, V. (1973) *The Hamadsha: A Study in Moroccan Ethno-psychiatry*, Berkeley, Calif.

Crisp, A. H., Palmer, R. L. and Kalucy, R. S. (1976) 'How common is anorexia nervosa? A prevalence study', *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 128, pp. 549–54.

Crisp, A. H. and Toms, D. A. (1972) 'Primary anorexia or weight phobia in the male: report on 13 cases', *British Medical Journal*, 1, pp. 334–8.

Dahrendorf, R. (1968) *Essays in the Theory of Society*, London.

Danto, A. C. (1975) *Sartre*, London.

Davies, M. (1982) 'Corsets and conception: fashion and demographic trends in the nineteenth century', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 24, pp. 611–41.

Davis, N. (1971) 'The reasons of misrule: youth groups in sixteenth-century France', *Past and Present*, 50, pp. 41–75.

Debus, A. G. (ed.) (1972) *Science, Medicine and Society in the Renaissance*, New York.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1977) *Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, New York.

Derrida, J. (1978) *Writing and Difference*, London.

Donovan, A. L. (1975) *Philosophical Chemistry in the Scottish Enlightenment*, Edinburgh.

Donzelot, J. (1979) *The Policing of Families*, New York.

Dossey, L. (1982) *Space, Time and Medicine*, London.

Douglas, M. (1970) *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*, Harmondsworth.

Druss, R. and Silverman, J. (1979) 'The body image and perfectionism of ballerinas', *General Hospital Psychoanalyst*, 1, pp. 115–21.

Duby, G. (1978) *Medieval Marriages: Two Models from Twelfth-century France*, Baltimore and London.

Dupont-Sommer, A. (1961) *The Essene Writings from Qumran*, Oxford.

Durkheim, E. (1961) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, New York.

Durkheim, E. (1964) *The Division of Labour in Society*, Glencoe, Ill.

Durkheim, E. (1970) *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, London.

Durkheim, E. and Mauss, M. (1963) *Primitive Classification*, London.

Edelstein, L. (1937) 'Greek medicine in its relation to religion and magic', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 5, pp. 201–46.

Ehrenreich, B. and English, D. (1978) *For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Expert's Advice to Women*, New York.

Eisenstadt, S. N. (ed.) (1968) *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization*, New York.

Eliade, M. (1958) *Rites and Symbols of Initiation*, New York.

Elias, N. (1978) *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford.

Engelhardt, H. T. (1974) 'The disease of masturbation: values and the concept of disease', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 48, pp. 234–48.

Engels, F. (1934) *Dialectics of Nature*, Moscow.

Engels, F. (1952) *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, London.

Engels, F. (1959) *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow.

Engels, F. (n.d.) *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Moscow.

Epstein, I. (1959) *Judaism*, Harmondsworth.

Ewen, S. and Ewen, E. (1982) *Channels of Desire*, New York.

Featherstone, M. (1982) 'The body in consumer culture', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 1, pp. 18–33.

Feighner, J. P. (1972) 'Diagnostic criteria for use in psychiatric research', *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 26, pp. 57–63.

Feinstein, A. R. (1967) *Clinical Judgment*, Baltimore.

Figes, E. (1978) *Patriarchal Attitudes*, London.

Finucane, R. C. (1982) *Appearances of the Dead: A Cultural History of Ghosts*, London.

Fischer, D. H. (1977) *Growing Old in America*, New York.

Flandrin, J. L. (1975) 'Contraception, marriage and sexual relations in the Christian West', in R. Forster and O. Ranum (eds), *Biology of Man in History*, Baltimore and London, pp. 23–47.

Foucault, M. (1967) *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, London.

Foucault, M. (1970) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, London.

Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, London.

Foucault, M. (1973) *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, London.

Foucault, M. (1977) *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Oxford.

Foucault, M. (1979) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Harmondsworth.

Foucault, M. (1980a) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, Brighton.

Foucault, M. (1980b) *Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-century French Hermaphrodite*, Brighton.

Foucault, M. (1981) *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1. *An Introduction*, London.

Fox-Davies, A. C. (1909) *A Complete Guide to Heraldry*, London.

Freedman, R. (1975) *The Sociology of Human Fertility*, New York.

Freud, S. (1960) *Totem and Taboo*, London.

Freud, S. (1979) *Civilization and its Discontents*, London.

Freud, S. and Breuer, J. (1974) *Studies in Hysteria*, Harmondsworth.

Freund, P. E. S. (1982) *The Civilized Body: Social Domination, Control and Health*, Philadelphia.

Fromm, E. (1941) *Escape from Freedom*, New York.

Frye, R. M. (1954) 'Swift's Yahoo and the Christian symbols for sin', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 5, pp. 201–17.

Gane, M. (1983) 'Durkheim: the sacred language', *Economy and Society*, 12, pp. 1–47.

Gardiner, J. (1975) 'Women's domestic labour', *New Left Review*, no. 89, pp. 47–58.

Garfinkel, H. (1956) 'Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies', *American Journal of Sociology*, 61, pp. 420–4.

Gamarnikow, E. (1978) 'Sexual division of labour: the case of nursing', in A. Kuhn and A. M. Wolpe (eds), *Feminism and Materialism; Women and Modes of Production*, London, pp. 96–123.

Geoghegan, V. (1981) *Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse*, London.

Gibbs, J. and Erickson, M. (1975) 'Major developments in the sociological study of deviance', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 1, pp. 21–42.

Glass, D. V. and Eversley, D. E. C. (1965) *Population in History*, Chicago.

Glassner, B. and Freedman, J. (1979) *Clinical Sociology*, New York and London.

Goffman, E. (1968) *Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Harmondsworth.

Goffman, E. (1969) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, London.

Goffman, E. (1970) *Strategic Interaction*, Oxford.

Goffman, E. (1972) *Interaction Ritual*, London.

Goldmann, L. (1973) *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, London.

Gouldner, A. W. (1967) *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory*, London.

Gouldner, A. W. (1971) *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, London.

Gove, W. R. (ed.) (1975) *The Labelling of Deviance: Evaluating a Perspective*, New York.

Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, London.

Grierson, H. J. C. (1956) *Milton and Wordsworth*, London.

Groddeck, G. (1950) *The Book of the It*, London.

Groddeck, G. (1977) *The Meaning of Illness*, London.

Grylls, D. (1978) *Guardians and Angels: Parents and Children in Nineteenth-century Literature*, London.

Guerra, F. (1969) 'The role of religion in Spanish American medicine', in F. N. L. Poynter (ed.), *Medicine and Culture*, London, pp. 179–88.

Gull, W. W. (1874) 'Anorexia nervosa (apepsia hysterica, anorexia hysteria)', *Transactions of the Clinical Society of London*, 7, p. 22.

Hamilton, P. (1983) *Talcott Parsons*, London.

Hanfi, Z. (1972) *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*, Garden City, NY.

Hanna, T. (1970) *Bodies in Revolt: A Primer in Somatic Thinking*, New York.

Harper, P. (1982) *Changing Laws for Changing Families*, Melbourne.

Harré, R. (1964) *Matter and Method*, London.

Heller, A. (1976) *The Theory of Need in Marx*, London.

Heller, A. (1978) *Renaissance Man*, London.

Heller, A. (1979) *A Theory of Feelings*, Assen.

Heller, A. (1982) 'The emotional division of labour between the sexes: perspectives on feminism and socialism', *Thesis Eleven*, no. 5/6, pp. 59–71.

Henderson, L. J. (1935) 'Physician and patient as a social system', *New England Journal of Medicine*, 212, pp. 819–23.

Henderson, L. J. (1936) 'The practice of medicing as applied sociology', *Transactions of the Association of American Physicians*, 51, pp. 8–15.

Hepworth, M. and Turner, B. S. (1982) *Confession: Studies in Deviance and Religion*, London.

Hewson, M. A. (1975) *Giles of Rome and the Medieval Theory of Conception*, London.

Hill, C. (1964) *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, London.

Hindess, B. and Hirst, P. Q. (1975) *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*, London.

Hippocrates (1886) *The Genuine Works of Hippocrates*, New York, 2 vols.

Howell, M. and Ford, P. (1980) *The True History of the Elephant Man*, Harmondsworth.

Hubert, H. and Mauss, M. (1964) *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function*, London.

Huby, P. (1969) *Greek Ethics*, London.

Hudson, L. (1982) *Bodies of Knowledge: The Psychological Significance of the Nude in Art*, London.

Hunt, A. (1978) *The Sociological Movement in Law*, London.

Husserl, E. (1978) *The Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, New York.

Hymer, S. (1972) 'The multinational corporation and the law of uneven development', in J. Bhagwati (ed.) *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to 1990s*, London, pp. 113–140.

Inglis, B. (1981) *The Diseases of Civilization*, London.

Jaeger, W. (1944) *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, New York.

Jacoby, R. (1980) 'Narcissism and the crisis of Capitalism', *Telos*, 44, pp. 58–65.

James, W. (1929) *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London.

Janik, A. and Toulmin, S. (1973) *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, London.

Jay, M. (1973) *The Dialectical Imaginations: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950*, London.

Jeffrey, J. B. (1954) *Retail Trading in Britain 1850–1950*, London.

Johnson, T. (1977) 'The professions in the class structure', in R. Scase (ed.) *Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage and Control*, London, pp. 93–110.

Kalucy, R. S., Crisp, A. H. and Harding, B. (1977) 'A study of 56 families with anorexia nervosa', *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 50, pp. 381–95.

Kamenka, E. (1970) *The Philosophy of Feuerbach*, London.

Kantorowicz, E. H. (1957) *The King's Two Bodies*, Princeton, NJ.

Kavolis, V. (1980) 'Logics of selfhood and modes of order: civilizational structures for individual identities', in R. Robertson and B. Holzner (eds) *Identity and Authority: Exploration in the Theory of Society*, Oxford, pp. 40–60.

Kealey, E. J. (1981) 'Critical theory, commodies and the consumer society', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 1, pp. 66–83.

Kern, S. (1975) *Anatomy and Destiny: A cultural History of the Human Body*, New York.

King, L. S. (1954) 'What is disease?', *Philosophy of Science*, 21, pp. 193–203.

Kolakowski, L. (1978) *Main Currents of Marxism*, Oxford, 3 vols.

Kolko, G. (1961) 'Max Weber on America: Theory and Evidence', *History and Theory*, 1, pp. 243–60.

Kudlien, F. (1976) 'Medicine as a "Liberal Art" and the question of the physican's income', *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*, 31, pp. 448–59.

Kuhn, A. and Wolpe, A. M. (eds) (1978) *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production*, London.

Kunzle, D. (1982) *Fashion and Fetishism*, London.

Kurzweil, E. (1980) *The Age of Structuralism: Lévi-Strauss to Foucault*, New York.

Lacan, J. (1977) *Écrits: A Selection*, London.

Ladurie, E. Le Roy (1974) *The Peasants of Languedoc*, Urbana, Ill.

Lasch, C. (1980) 'Recovering reality', *Salmagundi*, no 42, pp. 44-7.

Lasch, C. (1979) *The Culture of Narcissism*, New York.

Laslett, P. (1968) *The World We Have Lost*, London.

Laslett, P. (ed.) (1972) *Household and Family in Past Time*, Cambridge.

Lawrence, M. (1979) 'Anorexia nervosa – the control paradox', *Women's Studies International Quarterly*, 2, pp. 93–101.

Leach, W. (1981) *True Love and Perfect Union: The Feminist Reform of Sex and Society*, London and Henley.

Lefebvre, H. (1971) *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, London.

Leiss, W. (1972) *The Domination of Nature*, New York.

Lemert, C. C. and Gillan, G. (1982) *Michel Foucault: Social Theory as Transgression*, New York.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1969) *Totemism*, Harmondsworth.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1970) *The Raw and the Cooked*, London and New York.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1976) *Tristes Tropiques*, Harmondsworth.

Lewis, C. S. (1936) *The Allegory of Love*, London.

Liu, A. (1979) *Solitaire*, New York.

Lloyd, G. E. R. (1978) *Hippocratic Writings*, Harmondsworth.

Lofland, L. H. (1973) *The World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space*, New York.

Lukács, G. (1971) *History and Class Consciousness*, London.

Lukács, G. (1974) *The Destruction of Reason*, London.

Lukács, G. (1980) *The Ontology of Social Being*, London, 3 vols.

McDonough, R. and Harrison, R. (1978) 'Patriarchy and relations of production', in A. Kuhn and A. M. Wolpe (eds) *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production*, London, pp. 11–41.

MacIntyre, A. (1970) *Marcuse*, London.

MacIntyre, S. (1977) *Single and Pregnant*, London.

McKinlay, J. B. (1973) 'Social networks, lay consultation and help-seeking behaviour', *Social Forces*, 51, pp. 255–92.

MacKinney, L. (1952) 'Medical ethics and etiquette in the early Middle Ages: the persistence of Hippocratic ideals'. *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 26, pp. 1–31.

McLachlan, H. and Swales, J. K. (1980) 'Witchcraft and anti-feminism', *The Scottish Journal of Sociology*, 4, pp. 141–66.

MacLean, I. (1980) *The Renaissance Notion of Women*, Cambridge.

MacLeod, S. (1981) *The Art of Starvation*, London.

MacPherson, C. B. (1962) *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, Oxford.

Malthus, T. R. (1914) *An Essay on Population*, London, 2 vols.

Mandel. E. (1962) *Marxist Economic Theory*, London.

Mann, M. (1970) 'The social cohesion of liberal democracy', *American Sociological Review*, 35, pp. 423–39.

Mannoni, M. (1973) *The Child, his 'Illness' and the Others*, Harmondsworth.

Marcel, G. (1951) *Le Mystère de l'Être*, Paris.

Marcuse, H. (1964) *One-Dimensional Man*, London.

Marcuse, H. (1968) *Negations*, London.

Marcuse, H. (1969) *Eros and Civilization*, London.

Margalith, D. (1957) 'The ideal doctor as depicted in ancient Hebrew writings', *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*, 12, pp. 37–41.

Margolis, J. (1976) 'The concept of disease', *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 1, pp. 238–54.

Markus, G. (1978) *Marxism and Anthropology*, Assen.

Marshall, G. (1982) *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis*, London.

Marx, K. (1926) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, London.

Marx, K. (1967) *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, New York.

Marx, K. (1970) *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, London.

Marx, K. (1974) *Capital*, London, 3 vols.

Marx, K. (1976) 'Theses on Feuerbach', in F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Peking, pp. 61–5.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1974) *The German Ideology*, London.

Mauss, M. (1979) *Sociology and Psychology: Essays*, London.

Mead, G. H. (1962) *Mind, Self and Society*, Chicago and London, 2 vols.

Mead, M. (1949) *Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World*, New York.

Mechanic, D. and Volkart, E. H. (1961) 'Stress, illness behavior and the sick role', *American Sociological Review*, 26, pp. 51–8.

Mercer, J. (ed.) (1975) *The Other Half: Women in Australian Society*, Harmondsworth.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) *Phenomenology of Perception*, London.

Mészáros, I. (1970) *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, London.

Miller, M. B. (1981) *The Bon Marché : Bourgeois Culture and the Department store 1869–1920*, Princeton, NJ.

Millett, K. (1977) *Sexual Politics*, London.

Milton, J. (1959) *The Complete Prose Works*, London.

Mogul, S. L. (1980) 'Asceticism in adolescence and anorexia nervosa', *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 35, pp. 155–75.

Molesworth, W. (1839) *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, London.

Morgan, D. (1975) 'Explaining mental illness', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 16, pp. 262–80.

Nicholson, J. (1978) 'Feminae gloriosae: women in the age of Bede', in D. Baker (ed.), *Medieval Women*, Oxford, pp. 15–29.

Nietzsche, F. (1968) *The Will to Power*, New York and London.

Nietzsche, F. (1973) *Beyond Good and Evil*, Harmondsworth.

Nietzsche, F. (1974) *The Gay Science*, New York.

Norton, C. E. (1894) *The Letters of James Russel Lowell*, New York.

Okin, S. M. (1980) *Women in Western Political Thought*, London.

Orbach, S. (1978) *Fat is a Feminist Issue*, New York.

Ortner, S. B. (1974) 'Is female to male as nature is to culture?', in M. A. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere (eds), *Women, Culture and Society*, Stanford, Calif. pp. 67–87.

Ossowska, M. (1971) *Social Determinants of Moral Ideas*, London.

Palmer, R. L. (1979) 'The dietary chaos syndrome – a useful new term', *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 52, pp. 187–90.

Palmer, R. L. (1980) *Anorexia Nervosa*, Harmondsworth.

Parkin, F. (1979) *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, London.

Parsons, T. (1937) *The Structure of Social Action*, New York.
Parsons, T. (1951) *The Social System*, London.
Parsons, T. (1975) 'The sick role and the role of the physician reconsidered', *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 53, pp. 257–78.
Parsons, T. (1977) *Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory*, New York.
Pasdermajian, H. (1954) *The Department Store: Its Origins, Evolution and Economics*, London.
Peel, J. D. Y. (1971) *Herbert Spencer : The Evolution of a Sociologist*, London.
Peters, R. (1956) *Hobbes*, Harmondsworth.
Petersen, W. (1979) *Malthus*, London.
Pflanz, M. (1975) 'Relations between social scientists, physicians and medical organizations in health research', *Social Science and Medicine*, 9, pp. 7–13.
Polhemus, T..(ed.) (1978) *Social Aspects of the Human Body*, Harmondsworth.
Pope, L. (1942) *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven, Conn.
Pospisil, L. (1971) *Anthropology of Law : A Comparative Theory*, New York.
Potts, T. C. (1980) *Conscience in Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge.
Poulantzas, N. (1973) *Political Power and Social Classes*, London.
Prestwich, M. (1980) *The Three Edwards, War and State in England 1272–1377*, London.
Pullar, P. (1970) *Consuming Passions: Being an Historic Inquiry into Certain English Appetites*, Boston, Mass.
Quaife, G. R. (1979) *Wanton Wenches and Wayward Wives*, London.
Reich, W. (1975) *Reich Speaks of Freud*, Harmondsworth.
Rescher, N. (1979) *Cognitive Systematization: A systems-theoretic Approach to a Coherentist Theory of Knowledge*, Oxford.
Riesman, D. (1950) *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*, New Haven, Conn.
Robertson, D. W. (1980) *Essays in Medieval Culture*, Princeton, NJ.
Rocher, G. (1974) *Talcott Parsons and American Sociology*, London.
Rolleston, H. and Moncrieff, A. (1939) *Diet in Health and Disease*, London.
Rosaldo, M. A. and Lamphere, L. (eds) (1974) *Woman, Culture and Society*, Stanford, Calif.
Rose, A. M. (1962) 'A systematic summary of symbolic interaction theory', in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), *Human Behavior and Social Processes: An Interactionist Approach*, London, pp. 3–17.
Rosenburg, C. E. (1979) *Healing and History*, New York.
Rotenstreich, N. (1965) *Basic Problems of Marx's Philosophy*, Indianapolis.
Roth, J. (1962) 'Management bias in social science research', *Human Organization*, 21, pp. 47–50.
Rousseau, J. J. (1960) *Politics and the Arts : Letters to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre*, Glencoe, Ill.

Rousseau, J. J. (1973) *The Social Contract and Discourses*, London.
Rousseau, J. J. (1979) *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, Harmondsworth.
Rowse, A. L. (1974) *The Case Books of Simon Forman*, London.
Russell, G. F. M. (1970) 'Anorexia nervosa', in J. H. Price (ed.) *Modern Trends in Psychological Medicine*, vol. 2, London.
Sabine, G. H. (1963) *A History of Political Theory*, London.
Sacks, O. W. (1976) *Awakenings*, Harmondsworth.
Sacks, O. W. (1981) *Migraine*, London.
Sartre, J.-P. (1957) *Being and Nothingness*, London.
Scheff, T. (1974) 'The labelling theory of mental illness', *American Sociological Review*, 39, pp. 444–52.
Schmidt, A. (1971) *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, London.
Schochet, G. J. (1975) *Patriarchalism in Political Thought*, Oxford.
Schutz, A. (1962) *Collected Papers*, The Hague.
Schwartz, O. (1949) *The Psychology of Sex*, Harmondsworth.
Scully, D. and Bart, P. (1981) 'A funny thing happened on the way to the orifice: women in gynaecology textbooks', in P. Conrad and R. Kern (eds) *The Sociology of Health and Illness*, New York.
Seguy, J. (1977) 'The Marxist classics and asceticism', *The Annual Review of the Social Sciences of Religion*, 1, pp. 94–101.
Seltman, C. (1956) *Women in Antiquity*, London.
Sennett, R. (1974) *The Fall of Public Man*, Cambridge.
Sennett, R. (1980) *Authority*, London.
Sheridan, A. (1980) *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*, London.
Shoemaker, S. (1963) *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, New York.
Shorter, E. (1977) *The Making of the Modern Family*, London.
Sigerist, H. E. (1961) *A History of Medicine*, Oxford, 2 vols.
Skultans, V. (1974) *Intimacy and Ritual: A Study of Spiritualism, Mediums and Groups*, London.
Skultans, V. (1979) *English Madness: Ideas on Insanity 1580–1890*, London.
Smart, B. (1982) 'Foucault, sociology and the problem of human agency', *Theory & Society*, 11, pp. 121–41.
Smith, S. R. (1973) 'The London apprentices as seventeenth-century adolescents', *Past and Present*, 61, pp. 94–161.
Smith-Rosenberg, C. (1972) 'The hysterical woman: roles and role conflict in 19th century America', *Social Research*, 39, pp. 652–78.
Smith-Rosenberg, C. (1978) 'Sex as symbol in Victorian purity: an ethnohistorical analysis of Jacksonian America', in J. Demos and S. S. Bocock (eds), *Turning Points: Historical and Sociological Essays on the Family*, Chicago and London, pp. 212–47.
Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978) *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology*, London.
Sontag, S. (1978) *Illness as Metaphor*, New York.

Soper, K. (1981) *On Human Needs: Open and Closed Theories in a Marxist Perspective*, Brighton.

Spiegelberg, H. (1960) *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, The Hague.

Staples, R. (1982) *Singles in Australian Society*, Melbourne.

Steiner, F. (1956) *Taboo*, London.

Stone, G. (1962) 'Appearance and the self', in A. Rose (ed.) *Human Behavior and Social Processes: An Interactionist Approach*, London, pp. 86–118.

Stone, L. (1979) *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800*, Harmondsworth.

Strauss, A. (1964) *George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology*, Chicago and London.

Strauss, A. L. and Glaser, B. G. (1975) *Chronic Illness and the Quality of Life*, St Louis.

Strauss, R. (1957) 'The nature and status of medical sociology', *American Sociological Review*, 22, pp. 200–04.

Strawson, P. F. (1959) *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, London.

Sturrock, J. (ed) (1979) *Structuralism and Since: From Lévi-Strauss to Derrida*, Oxford.

Sudnow, D. (1967) *Passing On: The Social Organization of Dying*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

Swaan, A. de (1981) 'The politics of agoraphobia' *Theory & Society*, 10, pp. 359–85.

Szasz, T. S. (1974) *Law, Liberty and Psychiatry*, London.

Talbott, J. H. (1964) *Gout*, New York.

Tawney, R. H. (1938) *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Harmondsworth.

Taylor, B (ed.) (1981) *Perspectives on Paedophilia*, London.

Taylor, F. K. (1979) *The Concepts of Illness, Disease and the Morbus*, Cambridge.

Taylor, G. R. (1953) *Sex in History*, London.

Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J. (1973) *The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance*, London.

Temkin, O. (1952) 'The elusiveness of Paracelsus', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 6, pp. 201–17.

Temkin, O. (1971) *The Falling Sickness*, Baltimore.

Temkin, O. (1973) *Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy*, Ithaca, NY.

Temkin, O. (1977) *The Double Face of Janus and Other Essays in the History of Medicine*, Baltimore and London.

Therborn, G. (1980) *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*, London.

Thomas, K. (1970) 'Anthropology and the study of English witchcraft', in M. Douglas (ed.) *Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations*, London, pp. 47–79.

Thomas, K. (1971) *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, London.

Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*, London.

Timpanaro, S. (1970) *Sul Materialismo*, Pisa.

Trevor-Roper, H. R. (1967) *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, London.

Turner, B. S. (1974) *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study*, London and Boston.

Turner, B. S. (1980) 'The body and religion: towards an alliance of medical sociology and sociology of religion', *Annual Review of the Social Sciences of Religion*, 4, pp. 247–86.

Turner, B. S. (1981) *For Weber : Essays on the Sociology of Fate*, London.

Turner, B. S. (1982a) 'The government of the body: medical regimens and the rationalization of diet', *British Journal of Sociology*, 33, pp. 254–69.

Turner, B. S. (1982b) 'The discourse of diet', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 1, pp. 23–32.

Turner, B. S. (1983) *Religion and Social Theory: A Materialist Perspective*, London.

Turner, B. S. (1984) *Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development*, London.

Underwood, E. A. (1977) *Boerhaave's Men at Leyden and After*, Edinburgh.

Vacha, J. (1978) 'Biology and the problem of normality', *Scientia*, 13, pp. 823–46.

Vaux, R. de (1961) *Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions*, London.

Veatch, R. (1973) 'The medical model, its nature and problems', *The Hastings Center Studies*, 1, pp. 59–76.

Veatch, R. (1976) *Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution: Our Last Quest for Responsibility*, London.

Veith, I. (1965) *Hysteria: The History of a Disease*, Chicago.

Vermes, G. (1976) *Jesus the Jew*, London.

Vološinov, V. (1973) *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, New York.

Wall, F. E. (1946) *The Principles and Practice of Beauty Culture*, New York.

Walsh, M. R. (1977) *Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply: Sexual Barriers in the Medical Profession*, New Haven, Conn.

Warnock, M. (1965) *The Philosophy of Sartre*, London.

Wartovsky, M. W. (1977) *Feuerbach*, Cambridge.

Watkins, J. W. N. (1959) 'Historical explanation in the social sciences', in P. Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*, Glencoe, Ill., pp. 503–14.

Weber, M. (1961) 'Science as a vocation', in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London, pp. 129–56.

Weber, M. (1965) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London.

Weber, M. (1966) *The Sociology of Religion*, London.

Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2 vols.

Weitman, S. (1970) 'Intimacies: notes towards a theory of social inclusion and exclusion', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 11, pp. 348–67.

Wesley, J. (1752) *Primitive Physick, or an Easy and Natural Method of Curing Most Diseases*, London.

Whyte, W. F. (1956) *The Organization Man*, New York.

Williams, R. J. (1963) *Biochemical Individuality*, New York.

Wilson, B. (1966) *Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment*, London.

Wilson, B. (1982) *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, Oxford.

Wirth, L. (1931) 'Clinical sociology', *American Journal of Sociology*, 37, pp. 49–66.

Wisdom, J. (1953) *The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy*, London.

Wolin, S. S. (1961) *Politics and Vision*, London.

Wollheim, R. (1971) *Freud*, London.

Wrong, D. (1961) 'The over-socialized conception of man in modern sociology', *American Sociological Review*, 26, pp. 184–93.

Yuval-Davies, N. (1980) 'The bearers of the collective: women and religious legislation in Israel', *Feminist Review*, 4, pp. 15–27.

Zaner, R. M. (1964) *The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body*, The Hague.

Zaretsky, E. (1976) *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life*, London.

Zola, I. K. (1972) 'Medicine as an institution of social control', *Sociological Review*, 20, pp. 487–504.

Index