# BUDDHA IS HIDING

REFUGEES * CITIZENSHIP * THE NEW AMERICA

Buddha s Hiding

Refugees, Citizen , the New America

Aih Ong

CONTENTS

Chapter 3

The Refugee as an Ethical Figure

"Why," I asked Cambodian immigrants I encountered, "did you decide to seek resettlement in the United States? Not France? Or Thailand?" Apparently incredulous at my query, they'd say, "America is the land of freedom— you know, the lady with the light," lifting up an arm holding an imaginary torch. This shining figure was what kept the war-traumatized refugees going in their long nights in Thai camps. By raising their arms, they elected to go to America, the home of freedom and wealth, far away from the demented Pol Pot regime, the chaos, poverty, and political uncertainty of Cambodia. But they were to find that the Lady of Liberty was merely one icon of what it means to be American, and that other images of different kinds of Americas were to play a role in constituting them as new citizens.

For Western liberal democracies, the decades of the 1970s and 1980s saw a resurgence in the immigration of workers and refugees displaced by wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The rising tides of migration across borders coincided with a decline in the welfare state and mounting nationalism. Faced with these conflicting pressures, Western governments began to examine ways to rewrite citizenship, immigration, and asylum laws. Citizenship suddenly became a malleable concept for various regimes intent on tightening the requirements for residence and citizenship. In Europe, governments sought to limit immigration by deporting illegal immigrants (France); making language a criterion of citizenship (the Baltic states); or, in extreme cases, launching campaigns of ethnic cleansing to engineer monoethnic nation-states (Bosnia). In the United States, the response to the outcry against immigrants and refugees was to enact a law cutting welfare benefits to both illegal and legal immigrants. Such laws have led to extreme differentiation among categories of newcomers: aliens (without papers) and undocumented workers on the one hand, and legal immigrants such as certified refugees,

work-permit holders, and green-card holders on the other. In states like California, public debates centered on what rights were appropriate for various categories of legal and illegal immigrants, as compared to long-term American citizens.

But citizenship for the disenfranchised American or the disadvantaged newcomer has always been about more than the possession of legal rights—though Native Americans, African Americans, and other racialized minorities have made, and continue to make, great sacrifices in pressing their claims to political membership in the country. As a number of American historians have noted, *belonging* in the United States has from the beginning been defined in part by unofficial social meanings and criteria. These have historically shaped not only the selective reception of newcomers, but also the internal stratifications and unequal access to prestige and power among those already here. For minorities and disadvantaged populations, the lived meanings of citizenship are completely entangled with such systems of exclusion, selection, and judgment.

This is an orienting chapter that examines the spatial and social disjunctions between the border camps where Cambodian refugees congregated in the early 1980s and the United States, their destination country. It also re-orients the reader from the world of refugee camps to the context of late twentieth-century America, by focusing on the forms of knowledge and power that have shaped racial and class politics here. These were the technologies that would receive, redefine, and recast Cambodian refugees as modern citizen-subjects. Preexisting categories—earlier waves of refugees, minorities, poor urban folk—were deployed and recast in social programs and techniques to provide the forms through which Cambodian refugees came to be interpreted, managed, and normalized as new ethnics. I trace three technologies of subject-making that intersected in the world of the newcomers: (1) historical racial bipolarism and orientalism, which have conditioned the response to successive waves of newcomers; (2) related processes in the government of poverty, migrants, and moral deviance; and (3) ways that the refugee as a moral figure has determined American foreign policy. Finally, I show how these technologies converged in shaping the reception of Southeast Asian refugees in California. I trace the genealogies of terms such as *black, underclass,* and *refugee,* which have historically been key concepts in the series of intersecting social technologies relating to race, class, poverty, and gender. Neoliberal rationalities for disciplining the poor, controlling welfare recipients, and for producing self-reliant subjects freely avail themselves of the classificatory schemes for positioning racial others, thus constituting citizen-subjects in ethno-racial terms. Later chapters contain a closer examination of the everyday, dynamic processes, practices, and possibilities of subject-making and self-making that were experienced by Cambodian refugees and those who worked with them.

Cal-
ious
ieri-

ged
ts—
iori-
iims
:ori-
een
his-
the
iose
ian-
ion,

inc-
d in
i re-
late
and
ich-
iod-
mi-
and
ime
iree
iew-
ndi-
sses
vays
licy.
ion
rms
:on-
ass,
:on-
vail
hus
in a
ios-
am-

THE LURKING LOGIC OF RACIAL BIPOLARITY

It is possible to chart a continuity in the dynamics of racial polarization throughout the history of the American nation. From its inception, the United States has been imagined as an implicitly racial and classist formation governed by an Anglo-Saxon hegemony that projects white race and class interests as universal for the nation.[1] The concept of America as a specific racial identity has been and continues to be the measure against which all potential citizens are rated as either within or marginal to the nation. As Patricia Williams, among other scholars of race, has noted, "The violently patrolled historical boundary between black and white in America is so powerful that every immigrant group since slavery has found itself assimilated as one or the other, despite the enormous ethnic and global diversity we Americans actually represent."[2]

Within a national ideology that projects worthy citizens as inherently white, the intertwining of race and economic performance has shaped the ways different immigrant groups have attained status, dignity, and thus a perceived racial identity. The racializing effects of class and social mobility were also associated with the emergence of an ideal of white masculinity as the normative qualities of manliness and civilization itself, in contrast to the qualities of "Indian" and "Negro" subjects.[3] David R. Roediger, inspired by W. E. B. Du Bois's ideas about race and class,[4] argues that the concept of "whiteness" developed among the working class within a slave-owning republic during the nineteenth century: "Whiteness was a way in which workers responded to a fear of dependency on wage labor and to the necessities of capitalist work discipline."[5] The founders' ideal of masculine independence found a convenient other in black slavery and "hireling" wage labor. The black population was viewed as embodying "the preindustrial, erotic, careless style of life the white worker hated and longed for."[6] Lewis C. Copeland observes that "[t]he Negro" as a "contrast conception" or "counter-race" is a legacy of white–black relations under slavery and Emancipation that "'naturalizes' the social order."[7] The free working man came to embody republican citizenship, and any immigrant who failed to gain independent livelihood was in danger of sinking into wage slavery, the antithesis of independent citizenship. For not fitting into the dominant ideals of modern industrial labor and entrepreneurship, non–Anglo Saxon immigrants came to be classified as subjugated in both racial and gender terms.

Brackette Williams has noted that both the definition of race and the position of the insider–outsider boundary shift with the influx of populations and changes in racial class formations.[8] By the early twentieth century, nativist assertions of whiteness were intensified by fears of job competition from immigrants, and the racialization of class became pervasive. Reginald Horsman writes in *Race and Manifest Destiny* that the intellectual community "fed

European racial appetites with scientific theories stemming from the supposed knowledge and observation of blacks and Indians."[9] This theory of "racial Anglo-Saxonism"[10] also made acceptance of Irish American (and southern European) immigrants highly contingent, for their whiteness was in dispute.[11] Karen Sacks notes, "By the 1920s, scientific racism sanctified the notion that real Americans were white and real whites came from northwest Europe," as opposed to Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean countries.[12] But whereas immigrant groups such as the Irish and the Jews could over time be assimilated by becoming middle-class and white,[13] groups from outside Europe have historically existed on the outside or in some borderland between the white and black ends of the racial continuum.[14]

The racial logic and framing of American belonging have been complicated by the reality and the ideal of the American imperium. As Horsman has argued, the concept of racial Anglo-Saxonism was tied to the sense of manifest destiny in the nineteenth century, when the nation reached the Pacific coast:

> Without taking on the dangerous burdens of a formal empire, the United States could obtain the markets and the raw materials its ever-expanding economy needed. American and world economic growth, the triumph of Western Christian civilization, and a stable world order could be achieved by the American economic penetration of underdeveloped areas.[15]

American imperialism has been crucial to the formation of an American mythologized identity, one that is based on the romance of the frontier and the land of the free. According to Amy Kaplan, American imperialist domination overseas has been central to ways America imagines its destiny and cultural exceptionalism, not least in providing "the cultural discourses of race, gender, ethnicity, and class at home."[16]

American "orientalism" (which I use in the Saidian sense, of a form of knowledge about the Other that is situated in a geographical and conceptual Orient dominated by the West) has also influenced concepts of belonging. American domination of Asia and the Californian history of racial exclusions have shaped American orientalism, which has been characterized by simultaneous fear and longing. Aversion to immigrants was especially virulent toward the Chinese, and legal exclusions against them culminated in quota laws in the 1920s.[17] Other groups from Asia were subsequently excluded. These measures merely slowed down the steady influx of workers from Asia who worked the fields, railroads, and plantations of the American frontier.

There is a striking continuity in civil society between perceptions, policies, and practices that first emerged in relation to Native Americans and blacks, and those relating to Asian immigrants. Ronald Takaki points out that in the late nineteenth century, early Chinese immigrants were subjected to

a process of "Negroization" and compared to black slaves as heathens perceived as a threat to republicanism. Chinese "coolies," like black slaves, were regarded as antagonistic to the free working man.[18] Orientalist images portrayed Chinese immigrants as "a depraved class," "new barbarians" (comparable to the "Red Man"), bloodsucking traders, and a threat to white women—altogether a cancer on American civil society.[19] These attitudes, which cast Asians outside the pale of white civilization, operated within the bipolar racial formation, assigning "primitive" Asians to the black half of the model, on the side of unfree labor and low public status, not belonging to the nation.

The same continuity can be seen in the civilizing mission that was first directed at defeated Native Americans. In the Philippines, the American invasion of 1898 crushed the nationalist movement, and Filipinos were compared to wild men and apes in the American press. Soon, American expatriates there embarked on a compassionate mission of uplifting the "little brown brother" through "benevolent assimilation."[20] The civilizing logic produced a distinct set of technologies that came to be applied to transforming immigrants' attitudes, habits, and goals. Just as Native Americans and African Americans were "reformed" through schooling, Asian immigrants who needed help from service agencies have also been subjected to a process of ethnic reformation, erasure, and cleansing in order to become more worthy citizens.[21] For instance, Chinese prostitutes in San Francisco were among the first Asian immigrants to be assisted and subjected to the subordinating love of church workers.[22] Church workers not only rescued and reformed Chinese prostitutes, they also vetted Chinese immigrant suitors to make sure that they were suitable.

This combination of paternalism and subordinating care, which had a legacy in plantation slavery, was directed toward transforming decadent immigrants into loyal, dependent, and affectionate subjects.[23] Other processes involved in subordinating assimilation were the control and removal of ethnic "tendencies" slaves and immigrants were assumed to have brought with them from their "primitive" cultures. During the process of industrialization of the "new South" in the early twentieth century, welfare capitalism was introduced to reform the "instinctual life" of black workers, aimed at teaching them habits of disciplined industry. Taylorism, or scientific management, became the technology for stripping "primitiveness" from factory workers and transforming them into modern men, or new ethnics.[24] Immigrant masculinity was Taylorized to channel a perceived tendency toward violence into bread-earning productivity. In short, although it is perhaps extreme to imagine a systematic synchronism in the history of the American nation of views on intrepid individualism, the white man, and deserving citizenship, the convergences and overlaps among concepts of race, civilization, and market behavior in shaping claims to citizenship are too routine to be dismissed.

THE GOVERNMENT OF POVERTY

Policies and practices aimed at normalizing the abnormal in order to assimilate the racial other safely into the moral economy of American capitalism ran parallel to the moral politics of poor relief. Racial differentiation in relation to work status is inextricable from racial stigmatization in relation to poverty reform. American welfare reforms, initially directed at poor widows and later extended to include poor immigrants and migrants to industrial cities, created another set of moralizing discourses that increasingly judged the black working poor as recalcitrant or lacking a work ethic; and this formulation came to dog other groups of poor immigrants, who were categorized as being on the black side of the divide.

Judith Shklar has argued that basic, historically derived American values of income earning and the vote define social standing in the nation. Once the franchise is achieved by women and minorities, the social right to work and to be paid becomes the primary source of public respect and prestige. From the perspective of the historically excluded—racial minorities, women, and immigrants—the struggle for American citizenship has "been overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion in the polity, an effort to break down excluding barriers to recognition, rather than an aspiration to civic participation as a deeply involving activity."[25] These intertwined goals—access to income and to voting, which are inseparable from attaining social standing, respect, and prestige—have been central to shaping the meaning and character of American citizenship.[26] This moral construction of citizenship was greatly challenged by the welfare state in twentieth-century America, when traditional discourses about poverty, work, and deserving citizenship came into conflict with ideas about the deserving poor and claims of entitlement to state support. To understand this, we need to pause a bit and consider the broader debates about social citizenship in liberal democracies.

In the aftermath of World War II, Thomas H. Marshall first considered citizenship as a question of modernity, particularly as regards the evolution of civil(ized) society in Great Britain. In his view, the political and civil rights to which each citizen was legally entitled were undercut by inequalities generated by expanding capitalism. Marshall saw the welfare state as the means to compensate for these economic and social inequalities, thus preserving solidarity within the nation-state.[27] In the 1980s, Marxist scholars highlighted the contradiction between democratic citizenship and social inequalities that exist in society, namely, the widening gap between abstract universalistic rights and real-world inequalities generated by market competition, racial difference, and immigration.[28] According to their view, the welfare state becomes the arena in which "interest groups in civil society used the public sphere to demand 'social rights'—the services or protection of the state."[29] Marxists in Great Britain use the term *social wage* to highlight the point that citizen-

ship is shaped by class conflict, because the social wage has enabled the working classes to continue their struggle for improved wages and working conditions.

But the focus on the negotiated social wage misses Marshall's deeper political argument about the ideological assumptions of the welfare state, and about civilization as a process. The welfare state as a technology of disciplining has some unintended social effects. First, concrete steps to relativize social inequalities may diffuse the class resentment of the subordinated by instilling the notion that class differences are a matter of material achievements, not ascribed rank. Second, these steps may attenuate the moral affronts associated with ranked lifestyles by instilling the view that differences are merely a matter of material possessions, which would mask the underlying racialist class logic that informs systematic prejudice and exclusivity. In other words, the institution of welfare may very well reinforce social preconceptions and inequalities by the very process of seeking to reduce material inequalities. Clearly, what is needed is a detailed investigation of how the access of poor people to civil society is structured through market and welfare technologies that deploy, disguise, and redistribute prejudices about poverty, race, and deserving citizenship. My concept of citizenship as the cumulative effects of technologies of government hopes to capture a dynamic process in everyday interactions of negotiation and struggle over key cultural values crucial to the social reproduction of material, racial, and symbolic inequalities in America.

As Michael Katz and his colleagues have argued, historical discourses about poverty, race, and morality are central to the construction of deserving and undeserving citizens in America.[30] Katz argues that before the late eighteenth century, poor-law reformers distinguished between "impotent" and "able-bodied" poor in order to justify the provision of public resources. By the early nineteenth century, discussion of poverty had become thoroughly moralized: the "worthy" poor were seen to have suffered from misfortune, while the "undeserving poor" (paupers) were the result of individual willful habits such as indolence, which came to be associated with crime.[31] By the late nineteenth century, poorhouses had been set up to instill the "labor maxim" and break the cycle of dependence within poor immigrant families. Reformers, legislators, and writers painted a dire picture of poverty, crime, and disease among the poor who had congregated in the industrializing cities. "Among the urban poor, an undeserving subset, dependent on account of their own shiftless, irresponsible, immoral behavior, burdened honest taxpayers with the cost of their support, threatened their safety, and corrupted the working poor. Increasingly concentrated within slum districts, they lived in growing social isolation, cut off from the role models and oversight once provided by the more well-to-do, reproducing their own degradation."[32] The few exemplars of the deserving poor were widows

who kept their children clean and disciplined, and able-bodied families cast out of work through no fault of their own. In the 1920s, the eugenics movement linked poverty to race, and while the early objects of scientific racism were certain European immigrants, the color of the undeserving poor increasingly became black after the massive influx of African Americans to the cities of the North in the 1950s. Urban-based African Americans and poverty were fused in a racist image of the undeserving poor.[33] As increasing numbers of recipients of aid to parents of dependent children were unmarried and black, African American women raising children on their own came to epitomize the undeserving poor. Welfare recipients were stigmatized as alcoholic, immoral, and incompetent mothers, and public opinion also turned against unemployed young black men, who were considered unskilled, unwilling to work, and dangerous. Gunnar Myrdal introduced the term *underclass* to describe inner-city African Americans who appeared less successful in integrating into the wider society than immigrant groups.[34]

In the 1960s, cultural difference was more explicitly added to the fusion of poverty and race, especially with the popularization of Oscar Lewis's "culture of poverty," a phrase he used to describe behavioral maladjustments (hopelessness, despair, ineffectiveness) said to prevent some groups from achieving success in terms of the values and goals of the larger society.[35] The debates about the culture of poverty reinforced the liberal perception of passivity among poor people of color and the need for direct intervention to break the cycle of deprivation and degradation that transmitted the culture of poverty from generation to generation. The stigmatization of black women and families accelerated with Daniel Patrick Moynihan's publication of *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action,* which argued that the proliferation of single-parent black families could be attributed to a "tangle of pathology," including "a black matriarchy."[36] Under the Johnson administration, the War on Poverty and Great Society campaigns expanded social programs, but the number of urban poor continued to rise in the decades that followed. In the 1980s, conservative writers such as Charles Murray resurrected the underclass debate, blaming social programs for undermining the will to work and fostering a demoralized way of life among racial minorities in the inner cities.[37] Others saw welfare recipients as feeling entitled to welfare support, or as working the system to their own advantage, or as passive and incompetent individuals unable to function in the labor market. Further debate about the underclass ensued as sociologists sought to define the concept in terms of various social attributes or surrounding social environment. Scholars enumerated categories of the underclass such as long-term welfare recipients, unwed teenage mothers, female-headed households, individuals engaged in petty crimes and other deviant behavior, and unskilled individuals who experience long-term unemployment.

Structuring conditions were identified, including entire inner-city communities cut off from employment opportunities and abandoned by the middle class, resulting in extreme concentrations of poor people isolated from mainstream society.[38]

Overlooked in the contemporary debate was Michael Katz's historical view that "it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the core of most welfare reform in America since the early nineteenth century has been a war on the able-bodied poor: an attempt to define, locate, and purge them from the rolls of relief."[39] Indeed, not only was the underclass debate framed in terms of the expectations of an "overclass"—one that "sets ideological standards under which society in general is expected to live"—but it was also posed in dialectical opposition to the notion of a "model minority" (a racialized minority group that can attain success in those overclass terms).[40] In the 1960s, the term *model minority* was coined to refer to Japanese Americans who, despite their wartime incarceration in camps, managed to gain upward mobility, "leading generally affluent, and for the most part, highly Americanized life. . . . there is no parallel to their success story."[41] The media soon broadened the term to include Chinese Americans, and Asian subjects came to be perceived as minorities who raised themselves up by their bootstraps. Asian Americans were stereotyped as embodying the human capital of diligence, docility, self-sufficiency, and productivity. And the model minority has often been wielded as an ideological weapon to chastise inner-city black communities for persistent problems of poverty, unemployment, and crime.

Critics of the homogenized underclass concept have argued that it has been seen only through the prism of the white middle-class family ideal. In particular, the stereotyped and stigmatized images of black families ignore the variety of family forms existing among inner-city African Americans, and fail to value women's contributions to family life under extremely difficult circumstances. The historical record shows that urban family patterns emerged in the context of racism, the enforced division along gender lines of work roles within and outside the home, and both labor union and employment discrimination.[42] Others point to the continuity of cultural norms and strategies such as extended family networks and fosterage, which suggest more fluid and multifamily models of child care and domestic support.[43] Anthropologists such as Carol Stack have conducted primary research on the importance of networks and strategies that enabled families to form links with wider social structures.[44] Still others have described the more subtle relations and heterogeneity of people and associations that have made inner-city communities more vibrant than the underclass model would allow, and that have made it possible for some families and individuals to surmount the structural conditions of the inner city against all odds.[45] Despite these challenges, belief in the existence of an underclass marked by specific features

of disadvantage persisted, and the same set of expectations came to shape the perception and governing of new waves of poor migrants, such as Puerto Ricans.[46]

The model-minority concept was equally homogenized, since it led to the assumption that all peoples of Asian heritage, very broadly defined, could be left in benign neglect and still manage to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. But in the early 1980s, the arrival of refugees from Southeast Asia caused the mass media, especially in California, to refine the idea of the model minority in terms of race and class. Journalists and policymakers came to distinguish between two categories of Asian Americans: on the one hand, the model-minority ethnic Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China along with Vietnamese immigrants; and on the other, the "new underclass" said to be represented by refugees from Cambodia and Laos. This bifurcated model also assumed that racial identity among immigrants to the United States directly corresponded to national origin. And it took for granted that ethnic formation depends on the link between race and class, so that Asian immigrants, like long-resident Americans, could be conceptually positioned in categories of worthy or less-worthy minorities.[47]

STATE DYNAMICS AND THE SPIRITUAL AMBIGUITY OF REFUGEES

Surely, the refugee was one of the most searing figures of the late twentieth century, but despite the news accounts and refugee biographies, little scholarly attention has been paid to refugee experiences of displacement, regulation, and resettlement abroad.[48] Instead, most attention is paid to the threat refugees are perceived to pose to the nation-state. For instance, intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations Security Council have depicted the massive number of refugees in problematic terms, as a threat to international peace and security. Nevzat Soguk argues that refugees are frequently regarded not as victims of aberrant states, but as "citizens gone aberrant."[49] He maintains that humanitarian interventions on behalf of refugees enforce intergovernmental regimentation that reinscribes the statist hierarchy of citizen–nation-state. Anthropologists have also adopted this model of opposition between refugee and state, viewing refugeeism as a social condition that is fundamentally opposed to the notion of rooted citizens, and thus a challenge to state sovereignty and to the global order of nation-states.[50] Liisa Malkki has argued that imagined nationhood tends to externalize refugees ideologically; thus refugees in general come to be considered morally impure, since they represent "an aberration of categories, a zone of pollution" in the "national order of things."[51] Her assertion is buttressed by other observers who claim that refugees are inevitably objects of suspicion and perceived as threats to state security.[52]

This focus on the nation and its others tends to eclipse the actual com-

plex, ambiguous, and interweaving processes that transform refugees back into citizens. There are millions of refugees languishing in international no-man's-land, but every day, refugees are also being resettled in new countries. The model that polarizes refugees and states as homogenized entities in international relations fails to consider how particular states and their publics may be *for* or *against* refugee influx at different points in time. Nor does it consider the complex ways in which different categories of refugees are variously imagined and received by the host country. For instance, in chapter 2 I showed that nationalist self-perception shaped Thailand's attitude about Cambodian refugees when they first massed along its border in 1979, but that attitude shifted under the pressure of geopolitical considerations. Indeed, individual states do not simply respond to refugee flows in a blanket fashion, but draw on past policies and current interests to respond to pressure for entry from refugees. American policies regarding refugees after World War II demonstrate a dramatic reversal in the moral status of refugees from different countries.

Instead of viewing refugees and citizens as permanently irreconcilable opposites, therefore, this study explores how the refugee and the citizen are the political effects of institutional processes that are deeply imbued with sociocultural values. What are the institutions and social mechanisms that transform people into refugees, and how do they regulate and reterritorialize the displaced? We have yet to produce a detailed understanding of the kinds of mechanisms and practices that assist refugees in returning to citizen status in adopted countries. How do the interpretations and strategies of newcomers trouble the distinction between refugee and citizen, and how do they unsettle the norms and forms of citizenship in the host country?

Most people think of citizenship as the possession of a bundle of rights—a legal condition. This notion of citizenship as nationality is fundamental, and distinguishes citizens from foreigners who are in a country without papers and other illegal residents. The history of American citizenship as nationality has been shaped by a series of inclusions and exclusions on the basis of xenophobia, racism, religious bigotry, and male privilege. At its founding, the country excluded African slaves, Native Americans, and anyone not born in the colonies from citizenship—despite the fact that the United States is a leading example of a "nation of immigrants," in which the naturalization of residents has always been central to the theory and practice of citizenship. Today, the country has millions of legal resident aliens (visa holders and green-card holders), many of whom will eventually seek naturalization.

What are the actual venues and lessons involved in becoming American, especially for the poor and disadvantaged? My approach to this question is to examine the policies and techniques of government that shape the reception, treatment, and transformation of newcomers—such as refugees—

into particular kinds of citizens within the American polity. Various state agencies and private associations converge in facilitating the transition of displaced peoples, with the goal of changing refugee-subjects, perceived as shiftless and suspect, into normalized citizens who can be reasonably integrated into the host society. When Cambodians arrived in the United States in the early 1980s, their status as refugees persisted even as they were being resocialized to become Americans. The relevance of refugee status for Cambodians illuminates how certain institutional processes shape the minoritization process of disadvantaged and at-risk immigrants, who come to depend on the refugee industry, the welfare state, and civic groups. Their position in American civil society as refugee-citizens was also shaped by ongoing debates about American citizenship, the welfare state, and multiculturalism.

Studying state power in the United States, perhaps more than in other societies, requires that we think not in terms of an overarching state apparatus, but in terms of a multiplicity of networks through which various authorities, nonprofit agencies, programs, and experts translate democratic goals in relation to target populations. Here Foucault's notion of governmentality is useful, in that we think of certain state activities as engaged in a project of moral regulation that attempts to give, in the words of Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, "unitary and unifying expression to what are in reality multifaceted and differential experiences of groups within society."[53] This role of modern state power in universalizing citizenship is paradoxically attained through a process of individuation, whereby people are constructed in definitive and specific ways as citizens—for example, as taxpayers, workers, consumers, or welfare dependents. A lacuna in Corrigan and Sayer's approach to universalizing the norms of citizenship is their exclusive focus on the state sector, which ignores the various domains, both formal and informal, in which converging forms of rule and ethno-racial discourses produce specific effects that define desirable or undesirable sorts of citizens.

The moral imperative to offer refugees shelter has been a hallmark of U.S. policy since 1945—a break from earlier policies, which privileged race, language, and assimilation over concerns about human suffering.[54] Since 1945, America's rise to the status of a global power has compelled Congress to give up aspects of its isolationist policy and to make up for the country's shameful abandonment of Jewish refugees in prewar years. In 1956 and 1957, the Hungarian uprising led to an influx of thousands of refugees via Austria, and refugees came to be defined as people escaping persecution from a communist state. In his book *A Nation of Immigrants*, John F. Kennedy celebrated highly skilled immigrants from communist countries, such as rocket scientists, inventors, and artists; he urged Americans to accept them alongside the poor huddled masses, and not resent or fear them.[55] Kennedy thus provided moral justification for refugees from communist countries who could be perceived as having little difficulty integrating into the nation.

In 1965, refugees were formally recognized as a special category of immigrants, as it became clear that refugees from communist states were not simply political exiles likely to return home later, but rather new immigrants. *Refugee status,* strictly defined, is bestowed only when claims for entry are made outside the United States to INS officials in third countries. The upshot of this policy is that, from the 1950s until the present, the United States has admitted well over 90 percent of refugees from communist countries.[56] This "calculated kindness" in immigration policy did not favor political exiles from places like Haiti, El Salvador, or Chile, who did not figure into America's global anticommunist agenda but were considered subjects of right-wing dictatorships allied with the United States.[57] Many of these would-be refugees were forced to enter the country illegally as aliens and seek asylum—making them subject to INS executive discretion, which has always been designed to maintain tight borders.[58]

Successive administrations consistently sought to transform each new arrival from communist regimes into a symbolic or literal "freedom fighter." For decades, this label was routinely applied to refugees ranging from members of the Hungarian uprising to Jews fleeing the Soviet Union's "evil empire," middle-class professionals escaping Castro's Cuba, and Afghan guerrillas resisting the Soviet invasion. Fervent anti-communism prompted a significant increase in the country quotas set for immigrants from Asia and Africa in the 1965 family reunification program. Many Chinese were finally able to leave so-called Red China and join U.S.-based families after generations of separation. The number of Asian and African immigrants rose steadily in the decade after the change. Since 1950, more than two million refugees have been admitted from communist countries, of whom three quarters of a million each came from Cuba and Southeast Asia, and more than half a million from Central and Eastern Europe.[59]

But as refugees settled down to become long-term residents, they lost their glow as freedom fighters, and congressional fears of communist subversion began to erode the unconditional welcome offered to escapees from communist regimes. By the 1970s, the image of refugees as politically activist soldiers against global communism began to wear thin, and in the climate of détente more care was taken with controlling refugee influx, which came to represent danger more than opportunity. In 1978, Castro's release of prisoners stirred fears of America admitting "spies, terrorists, and common criminals" among the refugees.[60] Furthermore, the Mariel boatlift of 1980 included for the first time a number of black Cubans (approximately 10 percent), and race began to color American perception of refugees from communist countries, who had until that time been represented by well-educated Europeans, especially Jews.[61]

The U.S. intervention to halt the spread of communism in Indochina ultimately resulted in waves of boat people fleeing Vietnam. In 1979, hundreds

of thousands of Cambodians fled to the Thai border after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. President Carter, in the spirit of his human rights campaign, signed a refugee act that increased immigration quotas for mainland Southeast Asian people displaced by the war. But by then, even refugees fleeing communist regimes had lost their earlier moral aura, and the new migrants compared unfavorably with the mid-century European intellectual elite who fled Nazism, communism, and war. Furthermore, Southeast Asian refugees were reminders of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. The timing of their arrival in the United States, along with underlying cultural and racial biases against Asians, made their reception a more ambiguous welcome.

Southeast Asians were the most prominent group of refugees to enter the United States in this era of moral limbo. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam signaled the beginning of the end of the cold war and the dawn of an era in which the refugee acquired a more ambivalent image. Floods of refugees—both legal and illegal—escaping from natural disasters, civil wars, ethnic wars, and adverse conditions in poor countries, flowed into the country. More and more, refugees came to be viewed as the byproduct of regional conflicts and underdeveloped economies that appeared to have little to do with American interests. Public sentiment gradually began to turn against the "boat peoples" of the world arriving in a recession-slowed United States. Consider, for instance, the heartless response to the Mariel boat people. Many Americans were worried about scarce housing, jobs, limits on welfare, and competition from immigrants. Rioting by Mariel Cuban refugees contributed to their image as "difficult migrants."[62] Compassion fatigue quickly set in, and a climate of antagonism greeted the growing influx of refugees of color from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The term *economic refugee* came into use to describe people fleeing not political persecution back home, but simply bad economic conditions. Southeast Asian refugees—who ranged from French-speaking professionals to illiterate peasants, from fervent anticommunists to former supporters of the Khmer Rouge, from CIA field guides to hapless tribals—also spoiled the model-minority image of Asian Americans as docile and productive citizens. They arrived just as American domestic policy, under Republican regimes, was shifting away from a welfare-state notion of custodial, collective support of the weak and poor toward emphasis on individuals' civic duty to reduce their burden on the state.

These factors greatly influenced the conditions of the Southeast Asian refugees' reception. Most studies have focused on the gains and failures, at the administrative level, of refugee policies.[63] But refugee politics goes beyond the use of displaced people as a political football between nation-states, or their treatment at the national level. The legacy of racializing expectations with regard to market potential, intelligence, mental health, and moral worthiness came to influence at the practical, everyday level the experiences

and understanding of both the newcomers and the long-term residents who assisted them. A number of state agencies were central in the management of Southeast Asian refugees, and these agencies, through their goals, strategies, and practices, came to shape the norms for thinking about and dealing with Southeast Asian refugees.

REFUGEE TRAINING AND RESETTLEMENT: DISCIPLINARY GOALS

Cambodian refugees arrived at a time that a new administration in Washington, which had won election by promising to "roll back the government," was introducing a new climate of limits on generosity toward immigrants and welfare recipients. The Refugee Act of 1980, however—a legacy of the previous adminstration—enabled refugees from Southeast Asia to receive a higher rate of state assistance than any previous group of immigrants arriving on American shores. In fact, a network of processing centers in the Philippines provided training to prepare refugees for entry into the American labor market. As Reaganomics sought to stem the "welfare explosion" that had been building since the 1960s and to stress the possibility of combining welfare and work, Southeast Asian refugees were the guinea pigs in an experimental overhaul of welfare, one front in the war against the underclass.

The Overseas Refugee Training Center (ORTC) in the Philippines prepared Southeast Asian refugees for "successful resettlement" by offering classes in English, cultural orientation, and "other topics like health, transportation, shopping, directions, and personal information."[64] Defenders of the program maintain that refugees were given preparation to meet the employment-related needs of refugee adults with children, adolescents, and homebound mothers, and that the training took into account the various educational backgrounds of refugees to prepare them better for the U.S. job market.

It seems fair to assume that the majority of refugee workers were well-intended toward refugees, seeking to help them adjust to some of the practical issues of survival in the strange new world they thought of, abstractly, only as the Land of the Free. But James Tollefson, who was a teacher at the center, claims that the top priority was to keep the refugees from going on welfare once they reached the United States. Refugee training not only prepared refugees for low-level jobs as janitors, hotel maids, and domestic workers, in an effort to tailor (Taylor?) their training to the needs of economic restructuring at home;[65] it also instructed them in the value of "job mobility," to help them adapt to cycles of employment and unemployment. He makes the further determinist claim that the ORTC was "part of a larger political-economic system that displaces [refugees] from their homes and then provides education suitable only for long-term peripheral employment. . . . Policy and ideology underlying the ORTC ensure that refugees serve the same

economic functions as African Americans and Latinos."[66] While it is not necessary to subscribe to a conspiracy theory of warmongering as a way to furnish the postindustrial American economy with cheap labor, it is clear that refugee training in the camps reflected the official perception that regardless of their former backgrounds, the majority of Southeast Asian refugees were going to be members of the working poor in the United States. It also appears that assumptions about the black and Hispanic underclass colored the teachers' expectations about the precariousness of the refugees' self-sufficiency, the limited kinds of jobs they could potentially fill, and their need for social discipline on arrival on the American mainland.

NEW ASIAN IMMIGRANTS: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND CLASS

Refugees from Southeast Asia arrived in two major waves. The first came after the fall of Saigon in 1975. Many of the Vietnamese refugees were relatively young, well-educated professional people whose former occupations and skills—as well as their experiences with Americans during the war years—helped them adapt to American society. They soon found jobs and set up family businesses, and have formed business enclaves in San Jose and in Orange County in California. Others depended on welfare support for a time while seeking a variety of employment opportunities in cities like Philadelphia.[67]

The second wave of Indochinese refugees, arriving after 1980, could be divided into two general groups: Cambodian and Laotian peasants who sought refuge in the Thai border camps, and ethnic Chinese boat people who fled Vietnam and were held in temporary camps in other Southeast Asian countries. Like other refugees, Cambodians entered the country with an I-94 document that gave them the legal right to enter, live, and work in the United States. With the document, they could apply for an adjustment of their legal status from refugees to permanent residents and, after a few years, could apply to become citizens. But they soon found that American citizenship involved being framed by policy, practices, and beliefs according to already existing classificatory schemes that identified groupings in terms of race, ethnicity, morality, and market potential.

From the beginning, people working with the refugees viewed Cambodians as less likely than the Vietnamese to attain economic success in the United States. Cambodian refugees arrived during a time of greater anxiety over the ideological, health, and economic threats represented by refugees not only from Southeast Asia, but also from Afghanistan and Ethiopia. A range of social "failures," from welfare dependency to poor performance in schools, were attributed not only to their agrarian background and war experiences, but also to an essentializing construction (that is to say, a definition based on basic, unchanging natural conditions) of cultural difference. In a practice that has been called "surveillance-correction," social scientists writing

up refugee reports provided ethno-racial classifications for social workers and teachers that made simplistic causal links between purported cultural features and employment potential.[68] Thus even though Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees came out of the same set of conflicts based on American intervention in Southeast Asia, Cambodians were explicitly differentiated from Vietnamese newcomers, as well as from Chinese immigrants.

In a report to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), scholars elaborated a "sociocultural" portrait of Cambodians (and Laotians) as more "Indian" than "Chinese" in the "Indo-chinese" identity (which was itself a construction of French imperialists).[69] This artifact drew on an anthropological construct of "loosely structured" society—a term normally used to describe certain features of Thailand, in contrast to the more rigidly organized societies of East Asia—and misapplied it to Cambodian society.[70] Policymakers argued that Cambodians were more individualistic and more prone to place feelings and emotions above obligations and to use Americans as role models than were the Vietnamese (who were more "Chinese").[71] There was no reference to the possible influence of the recent decades of war, social upheaval, and camp life on the behavior and attitudes of Cambodian refugees. But such cultural essentialism became received wisdom, and the view of Cambodians as having an "affectively oriented viewpoint" (in contrast to the Vietnamese) was shared by, among others, a public-health nurse I interviewed, who compared Cambodians to Hawaiians for their "love of children" and "nonaggressive" behavior (the Khmer Rouge notwithstanding). The use of such culturalist typification clearly marked Cambodians as less successful exemplars of the Asian "race," less model-minority material, and more underclass in orientation.

The historical connection between general welfare policies and refugee resettlement also came to shape perceptions of impoverished Asian refugees in the familiar terms already applied to the black urban poor. Economic self-sufficiency was the cornerstone of the Refugee Act of 1980, and by 1982, the ORR sought "to evaluate the progress made in reducing refugee dependence on cash assistance and ameliorating problems of community impact."[72] Many analysts began to assess the differential rates of employment among Southeast Asian refugees, using ORR statistics on prior educational and occupational backgrounds, English-language competence, family structure, sociocultural orientations, and mental health. They concluded that the Vietnamese were the most likely to be employed and to attain self-sufficiency.[73] Such assessments about the economic performance of different Asian immigrant groups thus recast their national origins as discrete ethnicities, and entangled those ethnicities with expectations about self-sufficiency, poverty, mental health, sociocultural deviance, and even "risk for juvenile delinquency."[74]

The metaphor of the underclass was now extended beyond long-resident American inner-city groups to include refugees from Cambodia and Laos.[75]

The term *refugee* came to adhere more tightly to Cambodians, Hmongs, and Miens, and to be synonymous with *welfare recipient;* over time it became detached from Vietnamese Americans. Immigrants from Cambodia and Laos became sharply contrasted to the homo economicus of ethnic Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese, who were celebrated for their "Confucian values," family businesses, and can-do attitudes, which were considered closer to the desirable norms of American citizenship.[76] In an eerie echo of the earlier historical beliefs about blacks and ethnic positioning in different regions of the country, social workers came in a sense to feel that because Cambodians were seen as more *disorderly* than other Asian refugees, they should be more firmly regulated as well.

Indeed, the negative associations of the term *refugee* (welfare dependent or welfare cheat) have become so strong that some Hmong and Cambodian Americans have taken to denying their national origins in casual encounters with mainstream Americans, claiming some other ancestry, such as Thai. And some new Thai immigrants, seeking to elude the now-common perception in California that to be Southeast Asian American was to be associated with the underclass, have chosen to identify themselves discursively and in social interactions outside their community with Chinese Americans.[77] This conceptual and spatial distancing of other Asian immigrants from Cambodian and Laotian Americans indicates the extent to which they have been located ideologically at the underclass end of the continuum, a position close to the black pole of the ethno-racial scheme.

By being subjected to a kind of ideological blackening, in contrast to the whitening of Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese immigrants (the stereotyped entrepreneurial self-starters), refugees from Cambodia and Laos came to be perceived as having more in common with other poor newcomers of color, such as Ethiopians, Afghans, and even Central Americans, among whom they were often found in low-wage jobs. They were sometimes compared to African Americans because of being welfare dependent and having high rates of teenage pregnancy, and because of their location and isolation in inner-city neighborhoods. Thus—regardless of the actual, lived experiences and cultural beliefs of Cambodians—social workers, policymakers, and the media clearly demarcated the form and content of their citizenship as low in human-capital potential and in economic productivity, a position detrimental to the normative biopolitical standards of American citizenship.

Brackette Williams has argued that historically, a transformist hegemony constructed racial and ethnic hierarchies based on which groupings have made crucial contributions to the nation. Both classificatory and stratificatory processes have persisted throughout U.S. history, regardless of whether liberal, radical, or conservative regimes were in power. These processes influence the "internal selectivity" of group features, as well as the external configuration of the features thought to constitute any such category and

the person who might occupy it. Different ethnic groups are thus continually engaged in "cultural struggles" to claim a higher status within the hierarchy, such contestations merely intensifying the stratificatory processes based on physical and cultural differences.[78] How did the processes of racial formation and underclass stigmatization converge in the experiences of Cambodian refugees? How did this group of newcomers become the Asian American other, seen to embody a mix of alterities: communist contamination, racial primitivity, and welfare dependency?

THE REFUGEE NETWORK IN CALIFORNIA

The Refugee Act of 1980 tried to balance refugee assistance with the expectation of gainful employment, a goal that resettlement agencies and social workers sought to instill in refugees. The strategy to get refugees into employment and off welfare gained urgency by 1987, when the fact that more than half of the eight hundred thousand refugees from Southeast Asia had settled in a few states where welfare benefits were most attractive caused widespread concern. Well over half of those who arrived after 1974 lived in California. Federal officials feared that without a program of voluntary relocation to other states, "a result could be perpetual dependence on the welfare system for many refugees."[79] Refugee leaders in California protested that the government's planned secondary resettlement program was a racially motivated attempt to restrict their freedom of movement, and so remigrations to join relatives, and to benefit from the warm weather and good welfare support, continued.

Compared to other states, California has the most generous package of public assistance for refugees and poor residents. Refugee provisions were time-limited, initially for up to three years from the date of arrival; but by 1987, Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) was cut back to two years. During this time of refugee support, they had to enroll in one of two refugee employment programs: to study English as a Second Language (ESL) and retool for the American job market, or to receive vocational or on-the-job training (OJT) for entry-level jobs. Most Cambodians from a peasant background who were not yet fluent in English were enrolled in the OJT program, which trained men to be mechanics, electronics workers, and janitors, and women to be caregivers for children. But even when refugee assistance came to an end, the majority of refugees still struggling to cope in this country automatically went on welfare, receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, which were relatively generous at both the state and the local levels in California.[80] For instance, a survey found that by the late 1980s, in the Southeast Asian refugee community 61 percent of "nuclear families with two wage earners" received assistance in California, as compared to about 12 percent in other states.[81] Nevertheless, at the petty-official level,

suspicion of Southeast Asian refugees was pervasive, and mechanisms of judgment and stigmatization sorted out different kinds of responsible and irresponsible welfare dependents.

In the San Francisco Bay Area, a key agency in refugee settlement was Catholic Charities, which reminded American volunteers that their "commitment to the refugee is a moral one, not a legal one." Volunteers should make refugees "feel welcome in their new home" and offer them "the hope of a new life."[82] One of its pamphlets, *Enriched by Their Presence: America's Southeast Asians* (1980), notes that since 1975, Southeast Asians have accomplished much:

> There aren't yet the accomplishments of exceptional refugees from the past, refugees such as Einstein or Stravinsky; but, as with every group of refugees that this country has welcomed, our newest refugees' accomplishments already range from the sublime—Royal Khmer Ballet dancers offering their gentle graceful steps to this nation's treasury of dance—to the ordinary—hurried steps to work by one who has lost everything.[83]

But besides offering charity, the church agency presents a strong message that accomplishment is the basis of deserving citizenship. Refugee helpers are reminded not to coddle refugees:

> Nevertheless, as sponsor, you should be careful not to consider the refugees as your children, dependent on you for care and protection. They are adults, capable of self-sufficiency; they should be encouraged to make their own decisions and should not be shielded too much.[84]

This lesson in economic self-sufficiency is particularly directed at the second wave of immigrants, the majority of them Cambodians and Laotians. Although all refugees are eligible for cash assistance, "it is recommended that refugees be encouraged to remain independent of public assistance, if possible,"[85] and to become productive as soon as possible:

> Early employment is the key to self-sufficiency for refugees. It is one of the most important parts of the resettlement process. . . . Early employment, even in an entry-level job, is the basic building block of self-sufficiency. Refugees should be encouraged to view their first jobs as steps towards a better employment future and economic independence.[86]

During the first decade after the arrival of the second wave, the ORR conducted research annually on the refugees' progress toward self-sufficiency and on possible barriers to employment. By the mid 1980s, officials were worried because their surveys revealed that despite government training and assistance programs, Southeast Asian refugees showed a high rate of dependence on public assistance, especially AFDC payments. Such findings

fueled fears of another underclass in the making, and despite what social workers on the ground knew about the struggles of refugee welfare recipients trying to patch together a living, there was great pressure to weed out welfare cheats and to push refugee populations without adequate employment skills into full self-reliance. (I discuss the travails of welfare recipients in chapter 5.)

Many members of the helping professions who served poor immigrants were themselves second- or third-generation ethnic Americans (Jewish, Japanese, Chinese Americans), or even first-generation Vietnamese Americans. Sentiment in favor of assisting "the poor, huddled masses" often has a nativist undercurrent, which (as others have pointed out) has always been part of the process of becoming and being American. Even first-generation citizens, the children of hardscrabble immigrants, can express anti-immigrant opinions on occasion.[87] Americans tend to share what Sylvia Yanagisako calls a "general folk model" of the old patriarchal family, which they trace to preimmigrant ancestors. Whether they are third-generation Italian or Russian-Jewish or Japanese Americans, long-resident citizens tend to view their current cultural norms—say, about marriage, love, and kinship—as personal modifications of what they see as biologically transmitted traditions.[88] There is a tendency to cast a baleful eye toward newcomers from the old country, who are usually perceived as too tightly knit, too hierarchical, and archaic in their family relations—qualities that are considered part of foreign racial groups, and thus wholly un-American.

Indeed, many workers in refugee resettlement and aid services who were children of immigrants tend to view poor newcomers through the prism of a folkloric image of immigrant ancestors, and to feel that they must be helped to be modern rather quickly. Just as policymakers educate social workers about ethnic differences, so social workers see themselves as having an educative, judgmental, and corrective relation to poor people. As we shall see in the following four chapters, there is remarkable continuity in both policy and practices by the helping professions—clinicians, social workers, policemen, lawyers—to cleanse newcomers of the perceived backward or immoral aspects of their antiquated culture, to govern their everyday behavior, and to make them individually responsible subjects of a neoliberal market society. In the clinic, the welfare office, the household, the police station, and the courtroom, Cambodian newcomers interacted with a variety of professional service providers who brokered relations and provided authorized accounts ("truths") of who the clients were, what was wrong with them, what was to be done, and how to go about doing it in order to succeed in America.

Yet despite the institutional structures of such encounters and the continuities of policy and practice toward urban minorities, I argue, practical citizenship as produced in these everyday domains can be highly unstable and

open to modification. There is a dynamic continuum of power in these practices of discipline and deflection, rules and ruses, conformity and chaos; and the political stakes in meaning and conduct are mutually constituted in interactions between refugees and professional experts. By discussing how service workers and their clients are equally participants in these practices, my analysis shows that such fluid power relations produced not only ongoing norms but also their perpetual undoing, creating possibilities for alternative expressions and notions of what it means to be human, not merely citizen.

in Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Carol J. Matthiasson (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 305–347.

50. Ledgerwood, "Khmer Images," p. 22.

CHAPTER 3

1. Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986); and Steven Gregory and Roger Sanjek, eds., *Race* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1994).
2. Patricia Williams, quoted in "America, Seen through the Filter of Race," *The New York Times*, July 2, 2000, op ed.
3. Gail Bederman, "Civilization, the Decline of Middle-Class Manliness, and Ida B. Wells's Anti-Lynching Campaign 1892–94," in *Gender in American History since 1890*, ed. Barbara Melosh (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 207–239.
4. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in the United States, 1860–1880* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1977 [orig. 1935]).
5. David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 13.
6. Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, pp. 13–14.
7. Lewis C. Copeland, "The Negro as a Contrast Conception," in *Race Relations and the Race Problem: A Definition and an Analysis*, ed. Edgar T. Thompson (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 179. I thank Brackette Williams for discussing these points with me and for supplying the references.
8. Brackette F. Williams, "A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race across Ethnic Terrain," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18 (1989): 401–444.
9. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, p. 3. This is the key book that establishes the broad-ranging processes of racialism in the evolution of American citizenship. For related perspectives, see Thomas J. Archdeacon, *Becoming American: An Ethnic History* (New York: The Free Press, 1983); and Richard Polenberg, *One Nation Divisible: Class, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States since 1938* (New York: Penguin, 1980).
10. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*.
11. Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, p. 14.
12. Karen Sacks, "How Did Jews Become White Folks?" in Gregory and Sanjek, eds., *Race*, p. 81.
13. Sacks, "How Did Jews Become White Folks?"
14. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*.
15. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, p. 303.
16. Amy Kaplan, "Left Alone with America," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 16.
17. There are several studies on the exclusions of Chinese and other Asians. See, e.g., Jack Chen, *The Chinese of America: From the Beginnings to the Present* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981); Roger Daniels, *Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988);

Ronald Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990 [orig. 1979]); and idem, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989).

18. Takaki, *Iron Cages*, pp. 216–217.

19. Takaki, *Iron Cages*, pp. 219–220.

20. See Stuart C. Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); and Vicente L. Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000).

21. For a personal and broader account of the variety of processes of ethnic cleansing suffered by Native Americans, see Leonard Peltier, *Prison Writings: My Life Is My Sundance* (New York: Holtzbrinck, 1999).

22. Lucie Cheng Hirata, "Free, Indentured, Enslaved: Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America," *Signs* 5 (1979): 3–29.

23. For a discussion of slaveholders' paternalism, see Eugene Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

24. Paul E. Peterson, ed., *Classifying by Race* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

25. Judith Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 3. This formulation of citizenship as social standing reflects the influence of Thomas H. Marshall's conception of the social right of all citizens to state benefits and supports that can help equalize the inequities generated by class and the marketplace; see his *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

26. Shklar, *American Citizenship*.

27. *Citizenship and Social Class*.

28. See Stuart Hall and David Held, "Citizens and Citizenship," in *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s*, ed. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (New York: Verso), pp. 173–188; and the fine collection edited by Geoff Andrews, *Citizenship* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991).

29. Craig Calhoun, "Introduction," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 21–22.

30. Michael B. Katz, ed., *The "Underclass" Debate: Views from History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). The discussion that follows relies heavily on Katz's work, including his *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

31. Katz, "The Urban 'Underclass' as a Metaphor," in Katz, ed., *"Underclass" Debate*, pp. 6–7.

32. Katz, "Urban 'Underclass,'" pp. 10–11.

33. Katz, "Urban 'Underclass,'" p. 11.

34. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1944).

35. Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sanchez* (New York: Random House, 1961); and idem, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty, San Juan and New York* (New York: Random House, 1966).

36. See Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 39–125.

37. Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

38. William J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

39. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse*, p. 19. I thank Brackette Williams for bringing this reference and others on the underclass to my attention.

40. Andrew T. Miller, "Social Science, Social Policy, and the Heritage of African-American Families," in Katz, ed., *"Underclass" Debate*, p. 255.

41. William Peterson, "Success Story, Japanese American Style," *The New York Times Magazine*, Jan. 9, 1966, 20.

42. Kathryn M. Neckerman, "The Emergence of 'Underclass' Family Patterns, 1900–1940," in Katz, ed., *"Underclass" Debate*, pp. 194–219; Stanley Lieberson, *A Piece of the Pie: Black and White Immigrants since 1880* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

43. Miller, "Social Science."

44. Carol Stack, *All Our Kin* (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Charles Valentine, *Black Studies and Anthropology: Scholarly and Political Interests in Afro-American Culture*, A. McCaleb Module in Anthropology (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1972).

45. Katz, "Urban 'Underclass,'" p. 21.

46. See Philippe Bourgois, *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

47. Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 141–142.

48. For important studies of war refugees, see Liisa Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and E. Valentine Daniel, *Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

49. Nevzat Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 194.

50. Liisa Malkki, "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees," *Cultural Anthropology* 11.3: 377–404.

51. Malkki, *Purity and Exile*, pp. 3–4.

52. E. Valentine Daniel and John C. Knudsen, eds., *Mistrusting Refugees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and Soguk, *States and Strangers*.

53. Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 4–5.

54. Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 210.

55. John F. Kennedy, *A Nation of Immigrants* (New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1958).

56. Roger Charlton, Lawrence T. Farley, and Ronald Kaye, "Identifying the Mainsprings of U.S. Refugee and Asylum Policy: A Contextual Interpretation," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 1 (3–4), p. 243.

57. Loescher and Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness*, pp. 213–214.

58. Loescher and Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness*.

59. Charlton, Farley, and Kaye, "Identifying the Mainsprings," p. 249.

60. Loescher and Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness*, p. 151.

61. See Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, *City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 50–58.

62. Loescher and Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness*, p. 217.

63. Paul J. Strand and Woodrow Jones, Jr., *Indochinese Refugees in America: Problems of Adaptation and Assimilation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985); Loescher and Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness;* and Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*.

64. Donald A. Ranard and Douglas F. Gilzow, "Comments on James W. Tollefson's *Alien Winds: The Reeducation of America's Indochinese Refugees,*" *The TESOL Quarterly* (1991): 531.

65. J. W. Tollefson, *Alien Winds: The Reeducation of America's Indochinese Refugees* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 546, 549.

66. "Responses by Auerbach and James W. Tollefson," *The TESOL Quarterly* (1991): 546, 549.

67. For studies of Vietnamese Americans in San Jose, see James Freeman, *Hearts of Sorrow* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992); and in Philadelphia, see Nazli Kibrai, *Family Tightrope: The Life of Vietnamese-Americans* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

68. See Michel Foucault, "Social Work, Social Control, and Normalization: Roundtable Discussion with Michel Foucault," in *Reading Foucault for Social Work*, ed. Adrienne S. Chambon, Allan Irving, and Laura Epstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 93.

69. Ruben G. Rumbaut and Kenji Ima, *The Adaptation of Southeast Asian Youth: A Comparative Study,* Final Report to the Office of Refugee Settlement, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Family Support Administration (Washington, D.C.: Office of Refugee Resettlement, 1988), p. 73.

70. The texts cited by Rumbaut and Ima include John F. Embree, "Thailand—A Loosely Structured Social System," *American Anthropologist* 52 (1950): 181–193. This anthropological construction of Thai society has itself come under scholarly criticism: see, for example, Jack Potter, *Thai Peasant Social Structure* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

71. Rumbaut and Ima, *Adaptation*, p. 76.

72. Office of Refugee Resettlement, *Refugee Resettlement Program: Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1982), p. 22.

73. David W. Haines, "Vietnamese Refugee Women in the U.S. Labor Force: Continuity or Change?" in *International Migration: The Female Experience,* ed. Rita J. Simon and Caroline B. Brettell (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), pp. 62–75; Rumbaut and Ima, *Adaptation;* and Elizabeth Gong-Guy, *The California Southeast Asian Mental Health Needs Assessment* (Oakland, Calif.: Asian Community Mental Health Services, 1987).

74. See, for instance, Rumbaut and Ima, *Adaptation*, p. 123; Tony Waters and Lawrence E. Cohen, *Laotians in the Criminal Justice System* (Berkeley: California Policy Seminar, University of California, Working Paper Policy Research Program, 1993).

75. Jacqueline Desbarats, "Cambodian and Laotian Refugees: An Underclass," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, San Francisco, April 4, 1986; Isabel Wikerson, "Growth of the Very Poor Is Focus of New Studies," *The New York Times*, Dec. 20, 1987.

76. See Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), chap. 5, for a discussion of this construction of Chinese Americans.

77. Jiemin Bao, "Chinese-Thai Transmigrants: Reworking Identities and Gender Relations in Thailand and the United States," *Amerasia Journal* 25.2 (1999): 95–115.

78. Williams, "Class Act."

79. *The New York Times*, April 27, 1987, A10.

80. For another account of Cambodian refugee experiences in California, see Usha Welaratna, *Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

81. Robert L. Bach, "State Intervention in Southeast Asian Refugee Resettlement in the United States," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 1.1 (1988): 51.

82. United States Catholic Conference, *Working with Refugees: A Guide for Community Involvement* (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp. 6, 4.

83. Joseph Cerquone, *Enriched by Their Presence: America's Southeast Asians* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1980), p. 4.

84. Ibid.

85. Cerquone, *Enriched*, p. 14.

86. Cerquone, *Enriched*, pp. 5, 17.

87. Archdeacon, *Becoming American*.

88. Sylvia J. Yanagisako, *Transforming the Past: Tradition and Kinship among Japanese Americans* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985), pp. 259–260. See also Karen T. Leonard, *Making Ethnic Choices: California's Punjabi Mexican Americans* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).

CHAPTER 4

1. See David P. Chandler, *Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

2. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage, 1973).

3. See Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families: Welfare versus the State*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Hutchinson, 1980).

4. Martin Hewitt, "Biopolitics and Social Policy: Foucault's Account of Welfare," in *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory*, ed. Mike Featherstone, Mike Hepworth, and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 1991), p. 248.

5. Arthur W. Frank, "For a Sociology of the Body: An Analytical Review," in *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory*, ed. Mike Featherstone, Mike Hepworth, and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 1991), p. 40.

6. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1: *An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 168.

7. Frank, "For a Sociology of the Body," pp. 61–68.